A26921:87
Richard Baxter's dying thoughts upon Phil. I, 23 written for his own life and…
Richard Baxter's dying thoughts upon Phil. I, 23 written for his own life and the latter times of his corporal pains and weakness.
London: printed by Tho. Snowden for B. Simmons, 1683
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
§ 22. But why depart we from things certain, by such presumptions as these? Is it not certain, that there are baser creatures in the World, than Men or Angels? Is it not certain that one Man is not another? Is it not certain, that some men are in torment of body and mind? And will it be a comfort to a man in such torment to tell him, that he is God? or that he is part of an universal Soul? Would not a man on the Rack, or in the Stone, or other misery say, [Call me by what name you please, that caseth not my pain: If I be part of God, or an universal Soul, I am sure I am a tormented miserable part! And if you could not make me believe that God hath some parts which are Serpents, Toads, Devils, or wicked or tormented men, you must give me other senses, and perceptive powers, before it will comfort me, to hear that I am such a part. And if God had wicked and tormented parts on Earth, why may he not have such, and I be one of them hereafter? And if I be a holy and happy part of God, or of an universal Soul on Earth, why may not I hope to be such hereafter?
§ 23. We deny not but that God is the continued ⟨p. 14⟩first cause of all Being whatsoever; and that the branches and fruit depend not as effects so much on the causality of the Stock and Roots, as the creature doth on God; and that it is an impious conceit to think that the World, or any part of it, is a Being independent, and separated totally from God, or subsisting without his continued causation. But cannot God cause as a Creator, by making that which is not himself? This yieldeth the self-deceiver no other honour, nor happiness, but what equally belongeth to a Devil, to a Fly or Worm, to a Dunghill, or to the worst & miserablest man!
§ 24. II. As Man's Soul is a SUBSTANCE, so is it a Substance differenced formally from all inferior Substances, by an Innate (indeed Essential) Power, Virtue, or Faculty of Vital-Action, Intellection, and Free-will: For we find all these Acts performed by it, as Motion, Light and Heat are by the Fire or Sun. And if any should think that these Actions are like those of a Musician, compounded of the Agents (principal and organical several) parts, could he prove it, no more would follow, but that the lower powers (the Sensitive or Spirits) are to the higher as a Passive Organ, receiving its operations; and that the Intellectual Soul hath the power of causing Intellection and Volition by its Action on the inferior parts, as a man can cause such motions of his Lute, as shall be melody (not to it, but) to himself: And consequently, that as Music is but a lower operation of man (whose proper acts of Intellection and Volition are above it) so Intellection and Volition in the Body are not the noblest Acts of the Soul, but it performeth them by an Eminent Power, which can do greater things. And if this could be proved, what would it tend to the unbelievers ends, or to the disadvantage of our hopes and comforts?