An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches

§. 4. The grand difficulty about God's Unity with the World, and the World with God, is how to solve the difficulty that hath stalled the School-Doctors; That if the Creature have no ⟨p. xxiv⟩Entity distinct from God's, it is either part of God, or nothing: But it is not nothing, or no Substance (though some call it a shadow.) And it is not a part of God; for to be pars, is to be imperfect, and so to be no God. And if it have a real Entity distinct from God's Entity, then there would be more Entity in God and the Creature, than GOD alone: For two is numerally more than one; and two Entia have more Entity than one, how small soever the lesser be. And then God should be put part of Universal Entity, which is Imperfection. To say that the Creature hath part of Created Entity, but not of Divine Entity, seemeth to yield, that God is but part of Universal Entity. To avoid which, many Philosophers take up the Opinion, that the whole being of all Worlds is GOD, the material Part being his Body, and the eternal Spirit the Soul.

What shall we say to this? To silence it will not silence the Objectors. And sure we must not grant them, That the World is God; or that it is part of God; or that God is but a part of Real Substance or Entity; or that to be so is no Imperfection. Is there no other sounder way?

Though Divines say, that Dei non sunt accidentiae, and it's true, That God is all Essence and per essentiam operatur, yet I dread to assert, but humbly ask, Whether rather than fall into any of the former Opinions, it be not less dangerous to say, That as God hath made his Works in his likeness, and no Substance is without all Accidents, so the World be not quasi accidens Dei. And if so, it is no Part of Him, essential or integral: And as its Substance is not univocally such ⟨p. xxv⟩