A26923:317
An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches
An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches by reconciling explication without much disputing. Written by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for John Salusbury, 1691
Chapter 6 › An ANSWER TO Mr. Polehill's Exceptions about Futurition.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I do not Dispute it with you, but crave your proof, having said somewhat my self elsewhere upon that Question. You talk of [a thing's beginning to be Future before it's put into a Proposition, ⟨p. 65⟩&c.] As if you still begged the Question, and took Futurity extra mentem & signa, to be something ex parte rei. That which is not, is not true. A negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem Est •ertii valet consequentia, saith Dr. Twice often. You ask [Is it true because formed into a Proposition? Then all Propositions are true.] Ans. Is what true? That there is a Futurum? Is not that a Proposition? What is it antecedent to the Proposition that you call true? Is it the res futura? That's false. Is it the Realitas futuritionis ex parte •ei? That is it I deny. Futurum, saith Dr. Twice, & possibile, are termini diminuentes, signifying that the thing is not. Is it the Conceptus Divinus? If that be by a mental Proposition, it is not antecedent to it self; if not, doubtless God's Knowledge is true (efficiently, it will make the thing true) and true perfectively and denominatively, knowing things but as they are, and therefore not knowing Futurity Rei to be a Being. If it •e human Conceptions, they are mental Propositions, not eternal nor antecedent to themselves. All Propositions that God maketh are true: Because true Propositions are true, must all be true? Because it is a word or Proposition or Syllogism, which is the Subject of Logical truth, doth it follow that all Words, Propositions or Syllogisms are true?
I do not Dispute it with you, but crave your proof, having said somewhat my self elsewhere upon that Question. You talk of [a thing's beginning to be Future before it's put into a Proposition, ⟨p. 65⟩&c.] As if you still begg'd the Question, and took Futurity extra mentem & signa, to be something ex parte rei. That which is not, is not true. A negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem Est •ertii valet consequentia, saith Dr. Twisse often. You ask [Is it true because formed into a Proposition? Then all Propositions are true.] Ans. Is what true? That there is a Futurum? Is not that a Proposition? What is it antecedent to the Proposition that you call true? Is it the res futura? That's false. Is it the Realitas futuritionis ex parte ei? That is it I deny. Futurum, saith Dr. Twisse, & possibile, are termini diminuentes, signifying that the thing is not. Is it the Conceptus Divinus? If that be by a mental Proposition, it is not antecedent to it self; if not, doubtless God's Knowledge is true (efficiently, it will make the thing true) and true perfectively and denominatively, knowing things but as they are, and therefore not knowing Futurity Rei to be a Being. If it e human Conceptions, they are mental Propositions, not eternal nor antecedent to themselves. All Propositions that God maketh are true: Because true Propositions are true, must all be true? Because it is a word or Proposition or Syllogism, which is the Subject of Logical truth, doth it follow that all Words, Propositions or Syllogisms are true?