An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches

In a word, If you take futuritio rei to be the Name of any immanent eternal Act of God, whatever we think of the aptitude of your Phrase, I suppose we differ not about the thing intended, as long as you hold no eternal Accidents or Composition in God, and that nothing is eternal but himself; which I must think you do in Charity. If you take futuritio rei for the modus or relation of a humane Conception or Assertion de futuris, I suppose we shall not differ de re, nor will you say that it is eternal. 3. If you speak but suppositively, that if there had been such a conceptus or Assertion from Eternity, it would have been true, we differ not. 4. If you take Futurition extra mentem, to be any thing (Substance, Mode, Accident or any Reality or aliquid rei) and that from Eternity, I deny it, and say, That they that make an universal Spirit, and they that make Matter and Motion to be eternal ⟨p. 69⟩with God, are more excusable, than they that make a thing called Futurity distinct▪ from God; yea, the Futurity of Sin to be eternal, and God the eternal Cause of that eternal Effect.

I purposed at the first glance to have answered the second Paper also about God's decreeing Sin; but when I had read it I was unwilling, 1. Because it is but too largely answered materially in my Book already, and more fully in old Papers that lie by me, which I cannot transcribe. 2. Because I hear so much Good of the worthy Author, that I am not willing to be drawn to dispute a Case, which cannot be handled justly, without opening so much Evil in that which I must oppose, as will sound harsh towards one that I so much honour. Men are so apt to feel that as touching themselves which is spoken to their Cause. If Hobbes (who wrote the Treatise of Necessity against Bishop Bramhall) had sent me that Paper, I should readily have answered it: But here I fear it.

I purposed at the first glance to have answered the second Paper also about God's decreeing Sin; but when I had read it I was unwilling, 1. Because it is but too largely answered materially in my Book already, and more fully in old Papers that lie by me, which I cannot transcribe. 2. Because I hear so much Good of the worthy Author, that I am not willing to be drawn to dispute a Case, which cannot be handled justly, without opening so much Evil in that which I must oppose, as will sound harsh towards one that I so much honour. Men are so apt to feel that as touching themselves which is spoken to their Cause. If Hobbes (who wrote the Treatise of Necessity against Bishop Bramhall) had sent me that Paper, I should readily have answer'd it: But here I fear it.