An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches

1. God as he is fons naturae, is the Living God, the prime Active Principle, who by constant vital Activity is the Spring of all the Action in the World; and is not to be dreamt of as one that had made the World, and then left it to it self, and withdrew his hand and is fallen asleep. 2. But the Living God moveth not all things alike, but every thing according to its nature and place; for his Influx is received ad modum racipientium. ⟨p. 75⟩3. The Nature of some Creatures is essentially Active, and so inclined to act that they will act if their Nature be not by others, or want of concurrent Necessaries, hindered. Such is every Soul or living Principle, and Fire. And other Creatures are naturally Passive only ex se (or at least principally). So that for God to continue Fire or Souls or any naturally-active Principle, is to continue a nature essentially inclined to move or act. 4. It is supposed that these Natures are not solitary, but parts of the universe, and are continued with all necessary circumstant Beings and Objects; and that the whole frame of Nature and cooperating Causes are continued: e. g. That the Sun doth not stand still, while the Life of a Plant or Brute is continued. 5. All this being supposed by Durandus, Aureolus, a Dola, and all sober men, the Question debated is, Whether there be further necessary another immediate Divine Motion or Concourse to every motion of a Creature natural or free, besides all this aforesaid?

And, 1. Let it be considered, that God's Essence being but one, his Act, which ex parte agentis, is his Essence, is not distinguishable, saving ex connotatione effectus: And if this be all that is meant, That as ipse motus distinguitur a causis, so God's Will, Power and Agency may be distinctly denominated, 1. As from the second Causes; and 2. also from the Motion it self, as more than the Causes; this none can deny, nor is it a Controversy. But if the question be of the necessity of another distinct way of Divine Causation of the motus, besides that by second Causes before mentioned, they can prove no such necessity.

And, 1. Let it be consider'd, that God's Essence being but one, his Act, which ex parte agentis, is his Essence, is not distinguishable, saving ex connotatione effectus: And if this be all that is meant, That as ipse motus distinguitur a causis, so God's Will, Power and Agency may be distinctly denominated, 1. As from the second Causes; and 2. also from the Motion it self, as more than the Causes; this none can deny, nor is it a Controversie. But if the question be of the necessity of another distinct way of Divine Causation of the motus, besides that by second Causes before mentioned, they can prove no such necessity.