An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches

§. 38. 2. The Pelagians and some others seem to think that God doth not operate immediately on ⟨p. 170⟩mans Soul, as to proximity of Causation, but immediately on superior Causes and Means (as Angels, Word, Objects, &c.) and that when all means are duly ordered, man may be said to be able in his mere natural powers for the Act, because those means are now Grace sufficient to execute it. And that when one Means of an hundred is wanting, it is insufficient Grace.

§. 38. 2. The Pelagians and some others seem to think that God doth not operate immediately on ⟨p. 170⟩mans Soul, as to proximity of Causation, but immediately on superiour Causes and Means (as Angels, Word, Objects, &c.) and that when all means are duly ordered, man may be said to be able in his meer natural powers for the Act, because those means are now Grace sufficient to excute it. And that when one Means of an hundred is wanting, it is insufficient Grace.

§. 39. We all confess, that God worketh by means, and we cannot name an Act on us, which he always or ordinarily doth without any means, or second Cause. And we acknowledge that there are gracious means, and that ordinarily these must have a sufficiency in their kind: But withal we must say, that God worketh immediately as to proximity of Causation, when he worketh not so immediately as without second Causes: And that whether by means, or without means (as he pleaseth) there must be such a Disposition communicated to a depraved, undisposed Soul, as shall be a moral power, and put it into an immediate capacity to consent (or act): And to dispute the sufficiency of the means, is one thing, and to dispute the sufficiency of this inward Disposition or Power, is another. And this must be the question.