An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches

§. 15. It is more proper to say, That an Unbeliever, and unholy Sinner will not repent and believe, than that he cannot; though that also may be truly said, if well explained. But the meaning is not, that he cannot, though he sincerely would: Nor yet that he cannot be willing, for want of the natural Power of willing: But, 1. That he hath a Logical, and, 2. A moral Impotency; that is, an Indisposition; he wanteth both Disposition, Habit, and Act, but not the Faculty.

§. 16. It is an abusive miscarriage of those Disputants, who in the Words [CAN] and [CANNOT] use to confound not only, as aforesaid, natural and moral Power, but even Logical also, which is neither, and signifieth no more but that in ordine probandi; such Premises being put, the Conclusion Can or Cannot follow: For so it may be truly said, That no man can do, speak, or think any other than he doth; and nothing can ever come ⟨p. 178⟩to pass, but what doth come to pass; even from Gods fore-knowledge this will follow: For seeing nothing ever will be otherwise than God foreknoweth it will be, a Disputant will say, It can be no otherwise; but he must only mean that posita praescientia divina, the Conclusion cannot be true, that the Event will be otherwise: when yet as to the nature of Causation, we must say, sensu physico & morally, that it Can be otherwise oft-times, though it will not be otherwise.

§. 16. It is an abusive miscarriage of those Disputants, who in the Words [CAN] and [CANNOT] use to confound not only, as aforesaid, natural and moral Power, but even Logical also, which is neither, and signifieth no more but that in ordine probandi; such Premises being put, the Conclusion Can or Cannot follow: For so it may be truly said, That no man can do, speak, or think any other than he doth; and nothing can ever come ⟨p. 178⟩to pass, but what doth come to pass; even from Gods fore-knowledge this will follow: For seeing nothing ever will be otherwise than God foreknoweth it will be, a Disputant will say, It can be no otherwise; but he must only mean that posita praescientia divina, the Conclusion cannot be true, that the Event will be otherwise: when yet as to the nature of Causation, we must say, sensu physico & morali, that it Can be otherwise oft-times, though it will not be otherwise.