A26923:714
An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches
An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches by reconciling explication without much disputing. Written by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for John Salusbury, 1691
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
§. 16. It is a thing not to be believed, that this latter degree of Divine motion is never eventually effectual to the Act: Seeing, 1. it is granted, that there is such a Power in Man's Will as c•n act in some cases by that degree of Grace called Sufficient: And frustra fit potentia quae nunquam reducitur in actum. 2. And it's granted, that the Angels and Adam did act by such help. Therefore as to acts preparatory before special Faith, few do affirm that they are all done by such Grace as is necessarily effectual ex propria vi alone, but that sufficient Grace leaveth them often to Man's Will.
§. 17. Therefore all that remaineth, is to resolve what is the reason of the certain effect when we believe? To which I say, 1. It is ever an effect of two Causes (at least) God's motion and man's faculty, and so both must be said to be the Cause of the effect. 2. But man's will is no Cause (save a recipient Cause) of God's Part or Impress. 3. God sometimes, at least, maketh so powerful an Impress, as doth necessarily determine man's will, by a Necessity consistent with his Liberty. 4. It cannot be proved by any man, that no man believeth by that sufficient Motion, which doth not necessarily determine his will; seeing many preparatory ⟨p. 184⟩[…] ⟨p. 185⟩[…] ⟨p. 186⟩[…] ⟨p. 187⟩[…] ⟨p. 188⟩acts are done by such a motion. And it's probable that it is oft so. 5. But the certainty of this, or when and how oft it is so, no man can know.
§. 17. Therefore all that remaineth, is to resolve what is the reason of the certain effect when we believe? To which I say, 1. It is ever an effect of two Causes (at least) God's motion and man's faculty, and so both must be said to be the Cause of the effect. 2. But man's will is no Cause (save a recipient Cause) of God's Part or Impress. 3. God sometimes, at least, maketh so powerful an Impress, as doth necessarily determine man's will, by a Necessity consistent with his Liberty. 4. It cannot be proved by any man, that no man believeth by that sufficient Motion, which doth not necessarily determine his will; seeing many preparatory