An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches

§. 17. Therefore all that remaineth, is to resolve what is the reason of the certain effect when we believe? To which I say, 1. It is ever an effect of two Causes (at least) God's motion and man's faculty, and so both must be said to be the Cause of the effect. 2. But man's will is no Cause (save a recipient Cause) of God's Part or Impress. 3. God sometimes, at least, maketh so powerful an Impress, as doth necessarily determine man's will, by a Necessity consistent with his Liberty. 4. It cannot be proved by any man, that no man believeth by that sufficient Motion, which doth not necessarily determine his will; seeing many preparatory ⟨p. 184⟩[…] ⟨p. 185⟩[…] ⟨p. 186⟩[…] ⟨p. 187⟩[…] ⟨p. 188⟩acts are done by such a motion. And it's probable that it is oft so. 5. But the certainty of this, or when and how oft it is so, no man can know.

§. 17. Therefore all that remaineth, is to resolve what is the reason of the certain effect when we believe? To which I say, 1. It is ever an effect of two Causes (at least) God's motion and man's faculty, and so both must be said to be the Cause of the effect. 2. But man's will is no Cause (save a recipient Cause) of God's Part or Impress. 3. God sometimes, at least, maketh so powerful an Impress, as doth necessarily determine man's will, by a Necessity consistent with his Liberty. 4. It cannot be proved by any man, that no man believeth by that sufficient Motion, which doth not necessarily determine his will; seeing many preparatory ⟨p. 184⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 185⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 186⟩