An end of doctrinal controversies which have lately troubled the churches

§. 25. He that placeth Personality in the Trinity in SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, leaveth us to enquire of him: Q. 1. Whether it be by him presupposed or not, that there are the three foresaid Attributes called Essentialities or Formalities in one Divine [Greek or Hebrew], which we commonly call Substance or Spirit? Q. 2. Whether Conscire being scire, is not the ⟨p. xvi⟩proper Act of an Intellect, and not of a Will, or executive Power, as such? Q. 3. Self-perception indeed is a first and essential Act of every sensible Agent: But doth not that among men only prove sensible Life, which is in many▪ Faculties, and is as numerous as the Acts, and not prove many persons, seeing he must be first a Person who shall thus act? By seeing, I perceive that I see, and by hearing, that I hear, and by tasting, smelling, touching, that I taste, smell, and touch: I know these by Intellection, but I perceive them first by essential Sensation; and so by understanding, I immediately perceive that I understand and think: And by willing I immediately (not know, but) by a sort of eminent Sensation perceive that I will: And by vital Action I perceive that I act. Yet these are not distinct Persons, but the acts of one Person. Perception is essential to Vitality or Sense, but not constitutive of Personality.

§. 25. He that placeth Personality in the Trinity in SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, leaveth us to enquire of him: Q. 1. Whether it be by him presupposed or not, that there are the three foresaid Attributes called Essentialities or Formalities in one Divine 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, which we commonly call Substance or Spirit? Q. 2. Whether Conscire being scire, is not the ⟨p. xvi⟩proper Act of an Intellect, and not of a Will, or executive Power, as such? Q. 3. Self-perception indeed is a first and essential Act of every sensible Agent: But doth not that among men only prove sensible Life, which is in many▪ Faculties, and is as numerous as the Acts, and not prove many persons, seeing he must be first a Person who shall thus act? By seeing, I perceive that I see, and by hearing, that I hear, and by tasting, smelling, touching, that I taste, smell, and touch: I know these by Intellection, but I perceive them first by essential Sensation; and so by understanding, I immediately perceive that I understand and think: And by willing I immediately (not know, but) by a sort of eminent Sensation perceive that I will: And by vital Action I perceive that I act. Yet these are not distinct Persons, but the acts of one Person. Perception is essential to Vitality or Sense, but not constitutive of Personality.