Whether all these are Miracles, or most or many of them Contradictions, and therefore Impossibilities, I make no great matter of at this time. I think it utterly needless to add any more to what is said in answer to such sayings as Aquinas's (3. q. 75. & 76.) and other Schoolmen, that [The senses are not deceived, because there are the Accidents, and the Intellect is by faith preserved from deception: that the remaining accidents are in quantitate dimensiva quasi in subjecto: that these Accidents can change an extrinsic body, can be corrupted, can generate Worms, can nourish, can be broken, &c.] For all this at least confesseth, that its all done by Miracle: (Though I ⟨p. 109⟩will say, 1. That they could scarce have chosen a more unhappy pro-subject of Accidents than Quantity, nor have given more unhappy reasons for it than Aquinas doth q. 77. a. 2. c. 1. Because the sense perceiveth that it is Aliquid quantum, that is coloured. 2. Because Quantity is the first disposition of matter, &c. For this includeth matter: and Aliquid quantum is a word that giveth away his Cause: And no Accident is more the same with its subject than Quantity, or moles extensiva. 2. And he will be long before he will make or prove mans nature to be such, as that his Intellect can judge of substances by Believing, as incomplex objects, before it have perceived them by sense and imagination. When we see, taste, smell, feel, hear them, the Intellect will suddenly and necessarily have some species or perception of the Thing, before it come Logically to dispute from extrinsic media of Testimony, What this thing is in a second notion. And our question is, Whether the Intellect in this first Perception be deceived, or not? If you discharge the Intellect from perceiving substances presently, before it know them by second notions or Argument, you will make man quite another thing, than every hour and action tells us he is: But what will not a man say, when he sets himself only to study what to say for the making good of his undertaken Cause?
WHether all these are Miracles, or most or many of them Contradictions, and therefore Impossibilities, I make no great matter of at this time. I think it utterly needless to add any more to what is said in answer to such sayings as Aquinas's (3. q. 75. & 76.) and other Schoolmen, that [The senses are not deceived, because there are the Accidents, and the Intellect is by faith preserved from deception: that the remaining accidents are in quantitate dimensiva quasi in subjecto: that these Accidents can change an extrinsick body, can be corrupted, can generate Worms, can nourish, can be broken, &c.] For all this at least confesseth, that its all done by Miracle: (Though I ⟨p. 109⟩will say, 1. That they could scarce have chosen a more unhappy pro-subject of Accidents than Quantity, nor have given more unhappy reasons for it than Aquinas doth q. 77. a. 2. c. 1. Because the sense perceiveth that it is Aliquid quantum, that is coloured. 2. Because Quantity is the first disposition of matter, &c. For this includeth matter: and Aliquid quantum is a word that giveth away his Cause: And no Accident is more the same with its subject than Quantity, or moles extensiva. 2. And he will be long before he will make or prove mans nature to be such, as that his Intellect can judge of substances by Believing, as incomplex objects, before it have perceived them by sense and imagination. When we see, taste, smell, feel, hear them, the Intellect will suddenly and necessarily have some species or perception of the Thing, before it come Logically to dispute from extrinsick media of Testimony, What this thing is in a second notion. And our question is, Whether the Intellect in this first Perception be deceived, or not? If you discharge the Intellect from perceiving substances presently, before it know them by second notions or Argument, you will make man quite another thing, than every hour and action tells us he is: But what will not a man say, when he sets himself only to study what to say for the making good of his undertaken Cause?
