R. Though this be answered fully before, I will again tell you, That these two notorious falsehoods are all that you have to say against Humanity in this case, that's worth the noting. I. It is false that you say that sense perceiveth not substance: When I take up a staff or stone in my hand, I do not only feel Roughness or Smoothness, &c. but a substance: It is a quantitative, and qualitative substance, which I feel, taste, smell, see and hear: And this I perceive by sensation it self, as the medium to the Intellect. It is not the sense indeed, but the Intellect that giveth it the Logical notion or definition of a substance; but it is the sense it self that by sensation perceiveth it; and to deny this is to deny all sense.
And if it were not so, How could any such substance be known? when it cannot come into the Intellect but by the sense?
II. ☞ Your great cheat (or error) is by confounding the first and natural-necessary perception of a sensibile sensatum or incomplex object, by the Intellect, with the second conception of the Names of things, or of Organical second notions, and the third conception of them Artificially by the use of these names and Organical notions, and the fourth perception of Consequents from those conceptions. To know by Believing is but the third or fourth sort of knowledge, and presupposeth the two first. If a man had never heard a name or word in his life; yet by sensation as soon as he saw, smelt, tasted, heard, handled things, his Intellect would have had a perception of the Thing it self as it was sensate; And this is the Intellects first perception: And this is it which falleth under our question, Whether the Intellect in this first perception of a substance or Thing as sensate, be deceived or not, when the Thing hath the Conditions ⟨p. 122⟩of an object before mentioned. 2. Next this we learn or invent Names and organical notions for things: And whether these be true or false, and whether they be apt or inept is all one. This is but an arbitrary work of art. 3. Next this we conceive of things by the Means of these Names and second notions, and examine the Congruence: and so we define them: And this is but a work of Artificial Reasoning, and presupposeth the first Natural necessary perception. Now Faith belongeth partly to this, and partly to the fourth, which is The raising of Conclusions, and the weaving of methods;
R. Though this be answered fully before, I will again tell you, That these two notorious falshoods are all that you have to say against Humanity in this case, thats worth the noting. I. It is false that you say that sense perceiveth not substance: When I take up a staff or stone in my hand, I do not only feel Roughness or Smoothness, &c. but a substance: It is a quantitative, and qualitative substance, which I feel, taste, smell, see and hear: And this I perceive by sensation it self, as the medium to the Intellect. It is not the sense indeed, but the Intellect that giveth it the Logical notion or definition of a substance; but it is the sense it self that by sensation perceiveth it; and to deny this is to deny all sense.
And if it were not so, How could any such substance be known? when it cannot come into the Intellect but by the sense?
II. ☞ Your great cheat (or errour) is by confounding the first and natural-necessary perception of a sensibile sensatum or incomplex object, by the Intellect, with the second conception of the Names of things, or of Organical second notions, and the third conception of them Artificially by the use of these names and Organical notions, and the fourth perception of Consequents from those conceptions. To know by Believing is but the third or fourth sort of knowledge, and presupposeth the two first. If a man had never heard a name or word in his life; yet by sensation as soon as he saw, smelt, tasted, heard, handled things, his Intellect would have had a perception of the Thing it self as it was sensate; And this is the Intellects first perception: And this is it which falleth under our question, Whether the Intellect in this first perception of a substance or Thing as sensate, be deceived or not, when the Thing hath the Conditions ⟨p. 122⟩of an object before mentioned. 2. Next this we learn or invent Names and organical notions for things: And whether these be true or false, and whether they be apt or inept is all one. This is but an arbitrary work of art. 3. Next this we conceive of things by the Means of these Names and second notions, and examine the Congruence: and so we define them: And this is but a work of Artificial Reasoning, and presupposeth the first Natural necessary perception. Now Faith belongeth partly to this, and partly to the fourth, which is The raising of Conclusions, and the weaving of methods;
