A26935:49
Gods goodness vindicated for the help of such (especially in melancholy) as are tempted…
Gods goodness vindicated for the help of such (especially in melancholy) as are tempted to deny it, and think him cruel, because of the present and future misery of mankind, with respect to the doctrine of reprobation and damnation / by Richard Baxter ... ; published and prefaced by a friend at whose desire it was written, and to whom it was committed.
London: printed for N. Simmons, 1671
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
4. Gods Decrees do cause no mans sin, (nor his damnation any further than as as supposing sin:) for Dr. Twice himself still professeth, 1. That Reprobation is an Immanent act, and nihil ponit in objecto, putteth nothing at all into the person. 2. And that Reprobation inferreth no necessity of sin or misery, but ⟨p. 57⟩that which is called necessitas consequentiae, and not any necessitas consequentis; and Arminius and all confess that Gods bare foreknowledge causeth or inferreth a necessity consequentiae; which truly is but a Logical necessity in order of argumentation, when one thing is proved by another; and not by Physical necessity in order of causation, as one thing is caused by another.
4. Gods Decrees do cause no mans sin, (nor his damnation any further than as as supposing sin:) for Dr. Twisse himself still professeth, 1. That Reprobation is an Immanent act, and nihil ponit in objecto, putteth nothing at all into the person. 2. And that Reprobation inferreth no necessity of sin or misery, but ⟨p. 57⟩that which is called necessitas consequentiae, and not any necessitas consequentis; and Arminius and all confess that Gods bare foreknowledge causeth or inferreth a necessity consequentiae; which truly is but a Logical necessity in order of argumentation, when one thing is proved by another; and not by Physical necessity in order of causation, as one thing is caused by another.
And whereas they say [Then man might have frustrated Gods decree] I ask them, whether man can frustrate Gods fore-knowledge; suppose God to foreknow sin without decreeing ⟨p. 58⟩it (of which more anon) is not this a good argument (All that God foreknoweth will certainly come to pass. But God foreknoweth, e. g. Judas sin, Therefore it will certainly come to pass) And what of all this? It doth not come to pass because God foreknoweth it, no more than the Sun will rise to morrow, because you foreknow it.