Gods goodness vindicated for the help of such (especially in melancholy) as are tempted…

And whereas they say [Then man might have frustrated Gods decree] I ask them, whether man can frustrate Gods fore-knowledge; suppose God to foreknow sin without decreeing ⟨p. 58⟩it (of which more anon) is not this a good argument (All that God foreknoweth will certainly come to pass. But God foreknoweth, e. g. Judas sin, Therefore it will certainly come to pass) And what of all this? It doth not come to pass because God foreknoweth it, no more than the Sun will rise to morrow, because you foreknow it.

And if you say, That no power can frustrate Gods foreknowledge, I answer, They are delusory words of one that knoweth not what he saith: For it is one thing to have power to make God Ignorant, and another thing ⟨p. 59⟩to have power to do otherwise than that which he foreknoweth you will do. No man hath power to make God ignorant: But all sinners may have power to do otherwise than that which God foreknoweth we will do. For God doth not foreknow that e. g. Gehezi, shall not have Power to forbear a lye; but only that he will not forbear it: Yea more, Gods foreknowledge doth prove that sinners have power to do otherwise; For that which God foreknoweth will be. But God foreknoweth that men will abuse their power to sin, or will sin when they had Power to do otherwise, Therefore ⟨p. 60⟩it will be so in the Event.

Now if you will call their power to do otherwise, a power to frustrate Gods foreknowledge, you will but speak foolishly: For the Power it self is foreknown: And the object of knowledge in esse cognito, is not after the act of knowledge: And if the person will not actually sin, God could not foreknow that he will sin: So that foreknowledge is here (when it is not causal) but a medium in a Syllogism, and inferreth only the necessity of the consequence in arguing and doth not cause the thing