More proofs of infants church-membership and consequently their right to baptism, or, A second…

SECT. XXVIII.

R. B. I Come next to the sixth Question, Whether indeed there be any transeunt fact, which without the causation of any promise or precept, did make the Israelites Infants Church-members▪ This you affirm (if you would be understood;) whether this your ground of Infants Church-membership or mine be righter, I hope will be no hard matter for another man (of common capacity) to discern. By a [transeunt fact] thus set as contradistinct to a law, precept or promise, either you mean the act of legislation and promise making, or some other merely physical act. If the former, it is too ridiculous to be used in a serious business: For you should not put things in competition excluding the one, where they both must necessarily ⟨p. 57⟩concur, the one standing in a subordination to the other. Was there ever a Law or Covenant made in the world any other way than by a transeunt fact? Sure all legislation is by some signification of the Sovereigns will. And the making of that sign is a transeunt fact. If it be by voice, is not that transeunt? If by writing, is not the act transeunt? If by creation it self, the act is transeunt though the effect be permanent. And certainly if legislation or promising be your transeunt fact, you do very absurdly put it in opposition to a law (or promise) it being the making of such a law. And the legislation doth no way oblige the subject, but by the law so made: nor doth the making of a promise, grant or covenant, confer right to the benefit which is the subject of it, any otherwise than as it is the making of that grant which shall so confer it. As the making of a knife doth not cut, but the knife made: and so of other instruments. So that if the law oblige not, or the grant confer not, certainly the legislation or promise-making cannot do it. I cannot therefore imagine that this is your sense, without charging you with too great absurdity. As if you should say, It is not the will of the testator, i. e. his testament, that entitleth the legatary to the legacy, but it is the transeunt fact of the testator in making that will: or it is not the Sovereigns commission that authorizeth a Judge, soldier, &c. but it is the transeunt fact of writing or making that commission. It is not the sign that signifieth, but the transeunt fact of making that sign. Were not this a contemptible arguing?