A26960:208
More reasons for the Christian religion and no reason against it, or, A second…
More reasons for the Christian religion and no reason against it, or, A second appendix to the Reasons of the Christian religion being I. an answer to a letter from an unknown person charging the Holy Scriptures with contradictions, II. some animadversions on a tractate De Veritate, written by ... Edward Herbert, Baron of Cherbury ... / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Nevil Simmons, 1672
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Answ. First, To the last part first I answer, in your converse with men, you will think him unnatural, unsociable, mad, that will either believe all things or believe nothing. There is credible truth, and there is incredible falsehood: And will you believe that either God saith all that every Liar Fathereth on him, or else that he never revealeth his will to mankind any otherwise than by his common works. When God hath made a Revelation of his Will to the World, the Devils usual way of hindering the belief of it is by imitation, and by putting such names and colours on falsehood (by false Prophets) as God doth on the truth: Shall we therefore conclude that either all or none is the word of God. Or that God saith not true ⟨p. 127⟩unless the Devil say true also. Secondly, And will you mark the gross error of such Reasoners about the Notitiae Communes. First, It is certain that no actual Knowledge (conceptive or intellectual Verity) is born in man, Infants know not these Common. Notions at all. As the Eye is not born with the actual Species of all things afterward seen, but only with a seeing, power and disposition; so these are called common Notions, because mans intellect is so able and disposed to know them, as that they will be known easily upon the first due evidence or notification of the Object, and therefore almost all men know them. Secondly, It is certain that this knowing faculty in man (as this noble Lord saith) requireth its proper conditions for its true apprehension of the Object. Now some mens understandings have the help of these conditions far more than others have (he nameth to you the conditions himself.) Thirdly, It is certain that the understanding performs not all its apprehensions at once or at first, but by degrees and in time as the Objects are ⟨p. 128⟩duly presented. As an Infant seeth not the first day all that ever he must see; nor a Scholar learneth not the first day all that he must learn. Fourthly, It is certain that the latter apprehensions are as sure, if not more clear then the first: As he that lived twenty years at home, and afterward travelleth to London, doth as certainly then see London as before he did his Fathers house; so a Scholar doth afterward as certainly understand Horace, Virgil or Homer, as at first he understood his Primmer.
Answ. First, To the last part first I answer, in your converse with men, you will think him unnatural, unsociable, mad, that will either believe all things or believe nothing. There is credible truth, and there is incredible falshood: And will you beleive that either God saith all that every Lyar Fathereth on him, or else that he never revealeth his will to mankind any otherwise than by his common works. When God hath made a Revelation of his Will to the World, the Devils usual way of hindring the beleif of it is by imitation, and by putting such names and colours on falshood (by false Prophets) as God doth on the truth: Shall we therefore conclude that either all or none is the word of God. Or that God saith not true