A26960:236
More reasons for the Christian religion and no reason against it, or, A second…
More reasons for the Christian religion and no reason against it, or, A second appendix to the Reasons of the Christian religion being I. an answer to a letter from an unknown person charging the Holy Scriptures with contradictions, II. some animadversions on a tractate De Veritate, written by ... Edward Herbert, Baron of Cherbury ... / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Nevil Simmons, 1672
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Seventhly, Man was not born to know only things present in their existence by sense, but also to know things absent, things as past, and things as future. And herein he chiefly differeth from a Brute.
Seventhly, Man was not born to know only things present in their existence by sense, but also to know things absent, things as past, and things as future. And herein he chiesly differeth from a Bruit.
Eighthly, Though the understanding is most confident of things sensible & present, yet about things absent, past and future it oft doubteth more and is less satisfied in its own conclusions from natural principles, than from moral. Because sometimes the natural Principles themselves (though not the first, yet the second, or third) may be so obscure as to leave the mind unsatisfied. Secondly, And the connection among many particulars may be obscure and doubtful. Thirdly, And in the long Series of collection or arguing, the understanding suspecteth its own fallibility: so that when Conclusions are far fetched, though from natural Principles, the mind may be still in doubt about them. And on the contrary when in the way of Revelation the grounds are clear, and the understanding hath fewer Collections ⟨p. 144⟩to make and a shorter journey to go, it may be far better satisfied of the truth.
Eighthly, Though the understanding is most confident of things sensible & present, yet about things absent, past and future it oft doubteth more and is less satisfied in its own conclusions from natural principles, than from moral. Because sometimes the natural Principles themselves (though not the first, yet the second, or third) may be so obscure as to leave the mind unsatisfied. Secondly, And the connexion among many particulars may be obscure and doubtful. Thirdly, And in the long Series of collection or arguing, the understanding suspecteth its own fallibility: so that when Conclusions are far fetcht, though from natural Principles, the mind may be still in doubt about them. And on the contrary when in the way of Revelation the grounds are clear, and the understanding hath fewer Collections