A26963:57
The nature and immortality of the soul proved in answer to one who professed…
The nature and immortality of the soul proved in answer to one who professed perplexing doubtfulness / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for B. Simmons, 1682
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But what if fire▪ should differ from air materially, but in degree of subtlety and purity, or sensitive Souls from igneous, and mental from sensitive, but in higher degrees of purity of matter; Is it not the form that maketh the specific difference? Air hath not the igneous Virtue of Motion, Illumination, and Calefaction; nor ignis, the sensitive Virtues, nor mere sensitives the rational Virtues aforesaid. Forma dat esse & nomen. This maketh not a mere gradual difference, but a specific.
But what if fire▪ should differ from air materially, but in degree of subtilty and purity, or sensitive Souls from igneous, and mental from sensitive, but in higher degrees of purity of matter; Is it not the form that maketh the specifick difference? Air hath not the igneous Virtue of Motion, Illumination, and Calefaction; nor ignis, the sensitive Virtues, nor meer sensitives the rational Virtues aforesaid. Forma dat esse & nomen. This maketh not a meer gradual difference, but a specifick.
There is in Compounds matter, and materiae dispositio receptiva, & forma. There is somewhat answerable in spiritual uncompounded Beings. There is substantia, and substantiae dispositio, & forma. These are but intellectually distinct, and not divisible, and are but inadequate conceptions of one thing▪ That substantia is conceptus fundamentalis, is confessed. Some make penetrability and indivisibility, substantiae conceptus dispositicus. But the Virtus vitalis activa, intellective, volitiva, in one, is the conceptus formalis.
There is in Compounds matter, and materiae dispositio receptiva, & forma. There is somewhat answerable in spiritual uncompounded Beings. There is substantia, and substantiae dispositio, & forma. These are but intellectually distinct, and not divisible, and are but inadequate conceptions of one thing▪ That substantia is conceptus fundamentalis, is confest. Some make penetrability and indivisibility, substantiae conceptus dispositicus. But the Virtus vitalis activa, intellective, volitiva, in one, is the conceptus formalis.