The nonconformists plea for peace, or, An account of their judgment in certain things…

P. 193: The third Case is, when one imposeth an Oath of an ambiguous sense, only requiring that those words be sworn, permitting the swearer to understand the words in what sense he will: I say, it must deservedly be suspected that an Oath ⟨p. 330⟩offered on such a condition hath some latent ill deceit, and therefore is to be refused by a pious and prudent man; & to me seemeth to be disallowed, for three causes: 1. In respect to the Oath it self, in which Truth is first required: But a speech of indefinite and ambiguous sense before distinction made, is no true proposition; yea, no proposition at all; when a proposition, as Boys know, should signify truth or falsehood without ambiguity. 2. In respect of him to whom we swear: For the proper end of an Oath is, that he to whom it is made have some certainty of a thing before uncertain. 3. In respect to the swearer himself, who if he take an Oath in such condition, prepareth either a scandal for his neighbour, or a snare for himself. For such collusion cannot be imagined to look any other way, than either to draw others by our example to take the same Oath (though with a reluctant conscience) which is to scandalize our neighbour: or that somewhat else he after required of us to be done by virtue of that Oath, which is either unlawful, or incommodious; which is to lay a snare for our selves. Let a wise man therefore take heed that he suffer not himself to be imposed on by these Arts; or lest he so much value the favour or fear of any other man, as to swallow the bait when he knoweth that the hook is under it. Verily, that all may be rightly done when you swear, it is expedient that all parties be clearly agreed of the sense of the words that are interested in the matter; which by the Ancients was called [Liquido jurare]

P. 193: The third Case is, when one imposeth an Oath of an ambiguous sense, only requiring that those words be sworn, permitting the swearer to understand the words in what sense he will: I say, it must deservedly be suspected that an Oath ⟨p. 330⟩offered on such a condition hath some latent ill deceit, and therefore is to be refused by a pious and prudent man; & to me seemeth to be disallowed, for three causes: 1. In respect to the Oath it self, in which Truth is first required: But a speech of indefinite and ambiguous sense before distinction made, is no true proposition; yea, no proposition at all; when a proposition, as Boys know, should signifie truth or falshood without ambiguity. 2. In respect of him to whom we swear: For the proper end of an Oath is, that he to whom it is made have some certainty of a thing before uncertain. 3. In respect to the swearer himself, who if he take an Oath in such condition, prepareth either a scandal for his neighbour, or a snare for himself. For such collusion cannot be imagined to look any other way, than either to draw others by our example to take the same Oath (though with a reluctant conscience) which is to scandalize our neigbour: or that somewhat else he after required of us to be done by virtue of that Oath, which is either unlawful, or incommodious; which is to lay a snare for our selves. Let a wise man therefore take heed that he suffer not himself to be imposed on by these Arts; or lest he so much value the favour or fear of any other man, as to swallow the bait when he knoweth that the hook is under it. Verily, that all may be rightly done when you swear, it is expedient that all parties be clearly agreed of the sense of the words that are interessed in the matter; which by the Antients was called [Liquido jurare]