A26974:200
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions of divers learned and reverend brethren / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Argument 9. If there be in the very nature of a Covenant Condition in general, and of Gods imposed Condition in special, enough to persuade us that the benefit dependeth usually as much or more on some other act, as on that which accepteth the benefit it self: then we have reason to judge that our Justification dependeth as much on some other act, as on the acceptance of Justification; but the Antecedent is true, as I prove: First, As to Covenant Condition in general, it is most usual to make the promise consist of somewhat which the party is willing of, and the condition to consist of somewhat which the Promiser will have; but the Receiver hath more need to be drawn to. And therefore it is that the Accepting of the benefit promised is seldom, if ever, expressly made the Condition (though implicitly it be part;) because it is supposed that the party is willing of it. But that is made the express condition, where the party is most unwilling: So when a Rebel hath a pardon granted on condition he come in, and lay down arms, it is supposed that he must humbly and thankfully accept the pardon; and his returning to his allegiance, is as truly the condition of his pardon, as the putting forth his hand and taking it is. If a Prince do offer himself in marriage to the poorest Beggar, ⟨p. 36⟩and consequently offer Riches and Honours with himself, the accepting of his person is the expressed condition, more then the accepting of the riches and honours; and the latter dependeth on the former. If a Father give his son a purse of gold on condition he will but kneel down to him, or ask him forgiveness of some fault: here his kneeling down and asking him forgiveness, doth more to the procurement of the gold, then putting forth his hand and taking it.
Argument 9. If there be in the very nature of a Covenant Condition in general, and of Gods imposed Condition in specicial, enough to perswade us that the benefit dependeth usually as much or more on some other act, as on that which accepteth the benefit it self: then we have reason to judge that our Justification dependeth as much on some other act, as on the acceptance of Justification; but the Antecedent is true, as I prove: First, As to Covenant Condition in general, it is most usual to make the promise consist of somwhat which the party is willing of, and the condition to consist of somewhat which the Promiser will have; but the Receiver hath more need to be drawn to. And therefore it is that the Accepting of the benefit promised is seldome, if ever, expresly made the Condition (though implicitly it be part;) because it is supposed that the party is willing of it. But that is made the express condition, where the party is most unwilling: So when a Rebel hath a pardon granted on condition he come in, and lay down arms, it is supposed that he must humbly and thankfully accept the pardon; and his returning to his allegiance, is as truly the condition of his pardon, as the putting forth his hand and taking it is. If a Prince do offer himself in maraiage to the poorest Beggar,