A26974:202
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions of divers learned and reverend brethren / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
If you say, [But the efficiency is not equal, though it be equally a Condition] I answer; Neither of them have any proper efficiency in justifying us, unless you will unfitly call the Conditionality an Efficiency, or the Acceptableness of believing in the sight of God, an efficiency; there is no such thing to be ascribed to our faith as to the effect of Justification. But this belongs to another Controversy.
If you say, [But the efficiency is not equal, though it be equally a Condition] I answer; Neither of them have any proper efficiency in justifying us, unless you will unfitly call the Conditionality an Efficiency, or the Acceptableness of believing in the sight of God, an efficiency; there is no such thing to be ascribed to our faith as to the effect of Justification. But this belongs to another Controversie.
I know not what can be said more against this, unless by the Antinomians who deny the covenant of Grace to have any proper Condition, but only a priority and posteriority of Duties. But the express conditional terms of the Covenant do put this so far out of doubt, and I have said so much of it in other writings, that I shall not trouble my self here with this sort of Adversaries: Only to prevent their mistake, I shall tell them this: that in a condition there is somewhat Essential, and that is found in the conditions of Gods Promise; and therefore they are proper conditions: and there is somewhat Accidental: as First, sometime that the thing be Uncertain to the Promiser: This is not in Gods Conditions: It is enough that in their own nature the things be contingent. Secondly, That the matter of the condition be somewhat that is gainful to the Promiser, or otherwise have a merit, or moral causality: But this is separable: In our case it is sufficient that it be somewhat that God liketh, loveth, or is pleasing to him, though it properly merit not.
I know not what can be said more against this, unless by the Antinomians who deny the covenant of Grace to have any proper Condition, but only a priority and posteriority of Duties. But the express conditional terms of the Covenant do put this so far out of doubt, and I have said so much of it in other writings, that I shall not trouble my self here with this sort of Adversaries: Only to prevent their mistake, I shall tell them this: that in a condition there is somewhat Essential, and that is found in the conditions of Gods Promise; and therefore they are proper conditions: and there is somewhat Accidental: as First, sometime that the thing be Ʋncertain to the Promiser: This is not in Gods Conditions: It is enough that in their own nature the things be contigent. Secondly, That the matter of the condition be somewhat that is gainfull to the Promiser, or otherwise have a merit, or moral causality: But this is separable: In our case it is sufficient that it be somewhat that God liketh, loveth, or is pleasing to him, though it properly merit not.