A26974:331
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions of divers learned and reverend brethren / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Many other acceptions of the word in Physics by Zabarel, Claudius Alberius and others; you may see in Goclenii Lexic. Philosoph. in nom. conditio. But we are not in a Physical, but a moral discourse, and therefore must be understood according to the subject matter. It is therefore a Civil or Legal Condition that we have to enquire after, and must fetch our descriptions from Lawyers, and not from Physics, and therefore it is but deceitful equivocation in some Opponents, to fetch their opposition from Physical instances.
Many other acceptions of the word in Physicks by Zabarel, Claudius Alberius and others; you may see in Goclenii Lexic. Philosoph. in nom. conditio. But we are not in a Physical, but a moral discourse, and therfore must be understood according to the subject matter. It is therfore a Civil or Legal Condition that we have to enquire after, and must fetch our descriptions from Lawyers, and not from Physicks, and therefore it is but deceitful equivocation in some Opponents, to fetch their opposition from Physical instances.
The Lawyers give us divers Definitions of Condition, but for the most part they come all to one in sense. Some say, conditio est Lex adposita hominum actionibus, eas suspendens, Prat. Conditio (say others) est modus qui suspendit actum, donec co existent confirmetur. Vult. in Instit. de haere. instit▪ § 3. n. 6. Accursus faith, Conditio est suspensio, cujus de futuro effectus vel confirmatio pendet: Bart. Conditio est futurus eventus, in quem dispositio suspenditar. Cuiacius, Conditio est Lex addita negotio, quae donec praestetur eventum suspendit. These are of conditions de futuro: But those that are de praesenti vel de praeterito, suspend not the obligation, unless as they are yet futurae quoad cognitionem, though not quoad esse, and so the knowledge of a Right may be suspended. They are commonly divided into Casuaeles, Potestativas, & mixtas. The moral operation of Conditions as such, is not in causing the effect when performed, but in suspending the effect till performed. The reason of the appointing of them for such suspensions is various: sometime its because the person Giving, promising, or otherwise constituting the condition, is uncertain of the event of the performance, and would not have the effect come to pass without it. But that's not always: sometime though he might be sure of the event of performance, yet if he that is to perform the Condition be uncertain, it may make way for this constitution. It is therefore a vain Plea of them that say, God appointeth no conditions of his Promises,