A26974:702
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions of divers learned and reverend brethren / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And if you did, yet I have showed how uncertain it is, that this intelligere is only or formally pati. 2. But if you mean not this simple apprehension (as sure you do not) then how is it possible to imagine the understanding should be passive in it? Did ever man that writ of Philosophy once think that the soul did componere, dicidere, ratiocinari, judicare, patiendo & non agendo? I think no man. When Tolet disputeth utrum ixtelligere sit pati? he saith, Advertendum est quod sermo est de apprehensione; nam de compositione & Jud elo non est dubium apud omnes. Tol de anima. p. 166. I will not therefore suppose you to differ in your Philosophy from all men. What Act of the understanding you will make to be part of Justifying faith, I know not: For I find Divines are very little agreed in it: But the most make Assent to be the only Act of the understanding (though some add notitia) and of them some make it Essential to justifying Faith: and others but as a common prerequisite Act. Now if it were Assensus Noeticus, yet it is impossible it should be formally a Passion: but much more impossible when it is Assensus dianocticus vel discursivus, as is most evident it is, and our judicious Rob. Baronius truly teacheth, Philos. Theol. Anvil. Exerc. 3. Art. 16. Most Divines place the chief Essence of Faith in fiducia: but then they are as ill agreed what to mean by fiducia. Pemble would fain persuade us that to Believe the Truth of a particular Promise, is to trust on the performance of it to me; and that the Assent of Faith which is given to such a Promise, is properly called fiducia or Trust. But this is grounded on his singular opinion, that Truth and Goodness are all one, &c. Baronius, pag. 232. tells us of a four-fold fiducia: The first he makes to be but a confident Assent to the Truth of the Promise, and a firm sure Persuasion of the Remission of my own sins and of my Salvation. The second is a Resting on Gods Goodness alone, &c. He placeth the justifying virtue only in the first, which yet containeth but partly Assent (which we plead against the Papists usually not to be the justifying Act) and partly a particular Persuasion or Belief of Pardon, which is properly no ⟨p. 202⟩Faith, but that commonly called Assurance. Now this kind of fiducia is but the Assent we have spoken of, and is beyond all dispute no mere Passion, but an Act of the Understanding. 2.
And if you did, yet I have shewed how uncertain it is, that this intelligere is only or formally pati. 2. But if you mean not this simple apprehension (as sure you do not) then how is it possible to imagine the understanding should be passive in it? Did ever man that writ of Philosophy once think that the soul did componere, dicidere, ratiocinari, judicare, patiendo & non agendo? I think no man. When Tolet disputeth utrum ixtelligere sit pati? he saith, Advertendum est quod sermo est de apprehensione; nam de compositione & Jud elo non est dubium apud omnes. Tol de anima. p. 166. I will not therefore suppose you to differ in your Philosophy from all men. What Act of the understanding you will make to be part of Justifying faith, I know not: For I find Divines are very little agreed in it: But the most make Assent to be the only Act of the understanding (though some add notitia) and of them some make it Essential to justifying Faith: and others but as a common prerequisite Act. Now if it were Assensus Noeticus, yet it is impossible it should be formally a Passion: but much more impossible when it is Assensus dianocticus vel discursivus, as is most evident it is, and our judicious Rob. Baronius truly teacheth, Philos. Theol. Anil. Exerc. 3. Art. 16. Most Divines place the chief Essence of Faith in fiducia: but then they are as ill agreed what to mean by fiducia. Pemble would fain perswade us that to Believe the Truth of a particular Promise, is to trust on the performance of it to me; and that the Assent of Faith which is given to such a Promise, is properly called fiducia or Trust. But this is grounded on his singular opinion, that Truth and Goodness are all one, &c. Baronius, pag. 232. tels us of a four-fold fiducia: The first he makes to be but a confident Assent to the Truth of the Promise, and a firm sure Perswasion of the Remission of my own sins and of my Salvation. The second is a Resting on Gods Goodness alone, &c. He placeth the justifying vertue only in the first, which yet containeth but partly Assent (which we plead against the Papists usually not to be the justifying Act) and partly a particular Perswasion or Belief of Pardon, which is properly no