A26974:703
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions of divers learned and reverend brethren / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But most Divines make that fiducia which is an act of the Will to have the chief hand in this work of justifying: though Baronius is so confident that it is not an act of Faith, but an Effect and Consequent, that he takes it for a thing so manifest, that it needeth no proof, p. 234. And Dr. Downam hath brought not a few, nor contemptible Arguments to the same purpose against Pemble, Append. to Covenant of Gr. Yet though we have found it in the Will, yet it is hard to find what act of the Will they mean. If it be an Elicit Act, it must first either respect the End, and then it is either velle intendere vel frui: But sure fiducia is none of these: and if it were, it is more sure that at least the two first are not Passions; and I think not the last, though it be nothing to the present point: Or else 2. It must respect the Means; and then it must be Eligere, Consentire vel Uti (in which joined to Assent, I take justifying Faith to consist): But it is both evident that none of these is fiducia, and if they were, that none of these are passions or passive. So that hitherto we are to seek for this Passive Faith. Or else it is an Imparate Act; and then we are in a wood to seek among so many that there is little hope of finding it. The Truth seems to me to be beyond dispute, that fiducia is no one single Act (though one word) but a composition of many implying or containing the Assent of the understanding, the Election of the Will, especially much of Hope and Adventurousness in the Irascible of the Sensitive, together with a suspension of some acts. And if we are justified by this Recumbency or Fiducia, I shall believe we are justified as well by Hope as any thing; for that takes up most here, as Dr. Downam ubi supra proveth. And who ever said that in all or any of these the Soul is Passive and not Active? Indeed Hope and Venturousness are Passions, but in another sense (as Keckerm. and Tolet ubi supra have well opened; its in respect of their quasi materiale.) I am content to stand or fall by the vote of Philosophers, giving you 100 to one, whether the Formality of these motions ⟨p. 203⟩of the Will lie in Passion or Action? And if they are Acts. whether they can be the Subjects of Passion; and so be passive Acts? So that yet I cannot find out your passive Faith. 3. But yet further, if Faith be passive Physically, let us find out first what is the Agent? 2.
But most Divines make that fiducia which is an act of the Will to have the chief hand in this work of justfiying: though Baronius is so confident that it is not an act of Faith, but an Effect and Consequent, that he takes it for a thing so manifest, that it needeth no proof, p. 234. And Dr. Downam hath brought not a few, nor contemptible Arguments to the same purpose against Pemble, Append. to Covennat of Gr. Yet though we have found it in the Will, yet it is hard to find what act of the Will they mean. If it be an Elicit Act, it must first either respect the End, and then it is either velle intendere vel frui: But sure fiducia is none of these: and if it were, it is more sure that at least the two first are not Passions; and I think not the last, though it be nothing to the present point: Or else 2. It must respect the Means; and then it must be Eligere, Consentire vel Ʋti (in which joined to Assent, I take justifying Faith to consist): But it is both evident that none of these is fiducia, and if they were, that none of these are passions or passive. So that hitherto we are to seek for this Passive Faith. Or else it is an Imparate Act; and then we are in a wood to seek among so many that there is little hope of finding it. The Truth seems to me to be beyond dispute, that fiducia is no one single Act (though one word) but a composition of many implying or containing the Assent of the understanding, the Election of the Will, especially much of Hope and Adventurousness in the Irascible of the Sensitive, together with a suspension of some acts. And if we are justified by this Recumbency or Fiducia, I shall believe we are justified as well by Hope as any thing; for that takes up most here, as Dr. Downam ubi supra proveth. And who ever said that in all or any of these the Soul is Passive and not Active? Indeed Hope and Venturousness are Passions, but in another sense (as Keckerm. and Tolet ubi supra have well opened; its in respect of their quasi materiale.) I am content to stand or fall by the vote of Philosophers, giving you 100 to one, whether the Formality of these motions