A26974:712
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions of divers learned and reverend brethren / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Yea, and love it self more fitly then affiance may be said to receive or embrace its object (which is not therefore false neither because Bellarmine hath it: and you know he brings Austin's plain words, affirming love to be the hand by which they received him, &c.) I confess if I first renounce not the concurrent Judgement of Philosophers, I cannot approve of the common Answer which our Divines give to Bellarmine in this, viz. [That Faith receiveth Christs Righteousness first to make it ours, but Love only to retain it, and embrace and enjoy it when first we know it to be ours:] For though this say as much as I need to plead for, acknowledging Love to be as properly a physical Reception for retention, as Faith is for first Possession, yet if affiance be taken in any proper ordinary sense, it cannot thus hold good neither: for so Affiance must signify some act of the will in order of nature after love, or at least not before it. I acknowledge that so much of Faith as lieth in the understanding is before Love in order of nature; sicut ipse intellectus est simpliciter prior voluntate, ut motivum mobili, & activum passivo, ut Aquin. 1. q. §. 2. a. 3.2. and 12. q. 13. a. 1. C. For as he, Intellectus est ⟨p. 212⟩primum motivum omnium potentiarium animae quoad determinationem actus, voluntas verò quoad exercitium actus, Aquin, 12. q. 17. a. 1. C. But for the acts of the will toward Christ, I could give you (but to avoid tediousness I must forbear) at large the Testimony of Aquinas, Tolet, Gerson, Camero, Amesius, Zanchius, Rob. Baronius, Bradwardine, Ravio, Viguerius, &c. That Love is not only the first of all the Passions, but even the first motion of the Will towards its Object, and little or not at all different from Volition, diligere being but intensive veil. I have much more to say to this, which here I must pretermit. But still I speak not of Love as a Passion, but a true closure, as it were of the will with its Object as Good: and expect love to be proper to the sensitive, and strange to the intellective soul; we must make it the same with Veil: For Amor & ga•dium in quantum significant Actus appetitus sensitivi, passiones sunt; non autem secundum quod significant Actus appetitus intellectivi, inquit Aquinas. 1. q. 2. a. 1.1. The fifth Question is, Whether Faith be any Instrument of our Justification?
Yea, and love it self more fitly then affiance may be said to receive or embrace its object (which is not therefore false neither because Bellarmine hath it: and you know he brings Austines plain words, affirming love to be the hand by which they received him, &c.) I confess if I first renounce not the concurrent Judgement of Philosophers, I cannot approve of the common Answer which our Divines give to Bellarmine in this, viz. [That Faith receiveth Christs Righteousness first to make it ours, but Love only to retain it, and embrace and enjoy it when first we know it to be ours:] For though this say as much as I need to plead for, acknowledging Love to be as properly a physical Reception for retention, as Faith is for first Possession, yet if affiance be taken in any proper ordinary sence, it cannot thus hold good neither: for so Affiance must signifie some act of the will in order of nature after love, or at least not before it. I acknowledge that so much of Faith as lyeth in the understanding is before Love in order of nature; sicut ipse intellectus est simpliciter prior voluntate, ut motivum mobili, & activum passivo, ut Aquin. 1. q. §. 2. a. 3.2. and 12. q. 13. a. 1. C. For as he, Intellectus est