Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…

Now sure all Divines as well as the free-will-men, do acknowledge, that there can be no pleasing worth or virtue, where there is not liberty. And Suarez saith truly in that (T. 1. disp. 19 pag. (mihi) 340.) Addimus vero hanc facultatem quatenus libera est, non posse esse nisi Activam: seu è converso, facultatem non posse esse liberam, nisi sit activa, & quatenus activa est. Probatur sic. Nam Paisso ut Passio non potest esse Libera patienti: sed solum quatenus Actio à qua talis Passio provenit, illi est libera: Ergo Libertas formaliter ac praecise non est in potentia patiente, ut sic, sed in potentia Agente. (Vide ultra probationem.) 5. Yea I much fear lest this Passive Doctrine do lay all the blame of all mens infidelity upon God, or most at least: For it maketh the unbeliever no otherwise faulty then a hard block for resisting the wedge, which is but by an indisposition of the matter: and so Original indisposition is all the sin. For as Aquinas saith, Malum in Patiente est vel ab imperfectione, ⟨p. 217⟩vel defectu agentis, vel indispositione Materiae. 1. q. 49. a. 1. c. 3. My third proposition is, that the Receptivity or apprehension which is truly of the nature of faith, is yet but its aptitude to its Justifying office, and so a remote and not the direct proper formal reason: And this is the main point that I insist on: And it is evident, in all that is said already: and further thus, If faith had been of that apprehending nature as it is, and yet had not been made the condition in the gift or promise of God, it would not have justified: but if it had been made the condition, though it had been no apprehending (but as any other duty,) yet it would have justified: therefore it is evident that the nearest, proper reason of its power to justify is Gods making it the condition of his gift, and its receptive nature is but a remote reason: 1. If faith would have justified, though it had not been a condition, then it must have justified against Gods will, which is impossible: It is God that justifieth, and therefore we cannot be a cause of his Action. 2. It is evident also from the nature of this moral reception, which being but a willingness and consent, cannot of its own nature make the thing our own, but as it is by the mere will of the donor made the condition of his offer or gift. If I am willing to be Lord of any Lands or Countries, it will not make me so:

Now sure all Divines as well as the free-will-men, do acknowledge, that there can be no pleasing worth or vertue, where there is not liberty. And Suarez saith truly in that (T. 1. disp. 19 pag. (mihi) 340.) Addimus vero hanc facultatem quatenus libera est, non posse esse nisi Activam: seu è converso, facultatem non posse esse liberam, nisi sit activa, & quatenus activa est. Probatur sic. Nam Paisso ut Passio non potest esse Libera patienti: sed solum quatenus Actio à qua talis Passio provenit, illi est libera: Ergo Libertas formaliter ac praecise non est in potentia patiente, ut sic, sed in potentia Agente. (Vide ultra probationem.) 5. Yea I much fear lest this Passive Doctrine do lay all the blame of all mens infidelity upon God, or most at least: For it maketh the unbeliever no otherwise faulty then a hard block for resisting the wedge, which is but by an indisposition of the matter: and so Originall indisposition is all the sin. For as Aquinas saith, Malum in Patiente est vel ab imperfectione,