A26974:718
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions…
Of justification four disputations clearing and amicably defending the truth against the unnecessary oppositions of divers learned and reverend brethren / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed by R.W. for Nevil Simmons, 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
but if the true owner say, I will give them thee if thou wilt accept them, then it will be so: therefore it is not first and directly from the nature of the reception, but first because that reception is made the condition of the gift. If a condemned man be willing to be pardoned, he shall not therefore be pardoned: but if a pardon be given on condition he be willing or accept it, then he shall have it. If a poor woman consent to have a Prince for her husband, and so to have his possessions, it shall not therefore be done, except he give himself to her on condition of her consent. If it were a mere physical reception, and we spoke of a possession de facto of somewhat that is so apprehensible, then it would be otherwise: as he that getteth gold or a pearl in his hand, he hath such a possession: But when it is but a moral improper reception (though per actum physicum volendi vel consentiend• ), and when we speak of a possession ⟨p. 218⟩in right of Law, and of a relation and Title, then it must need; stand as aforesaid. Donation, (or Imputation) being the direct cause of our first constitutive justification, therefore conditionality and not the natural receptivity of faith, must needs be the proper reason of its justifying. This is acknowledged by Divines: Amesius saith, (Bellarm. Enervat. T. 4. p. (m•hi) 314. Apprehensio justificationis per veram fiduciam, non est simpliciter per modum objecti, sed per modum objecti nobis donati: Quod enim Deus donaverit fidelibus Christum & omni •cum eo, Scriptura disertis verbis testatur, Rom. 8.32. 2. And that if any other sort or act of faith, as well as this, or any other grace would have justified, if God had made it equally the condition of his gift, is also past all doubt. 1. Because the whole work of Justifying dependeth merely on Gods free Grace and will and thence it is that faith is deputed to its office. 2. Who doubteth but God could have bestowed pardon and justification on other terms or conditions, if he would? 3. Yea who doubteth but he might have given them without any condition, even that of acceptance? Yea though we had never known that there had been a Redeemer, yet God might have justified us for his sake. I speak not what he may now do after he resolved of a course in his Covenant: