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A26976:193

Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits.…

Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits. Two discourses, one in a letter to an unknown doubter, the other in a reply to Dr. Henry Moore's Animadversions on a private letter to him, which he published in his second edition of Mr. Joseph Glanvil's Sadducismus triumphatus, or, History of apparitions by Richard Baxter.

Richard Baxter 1615–1691London: printed for B. Simons, 1682

[8], 3-72 p. · 38k words · Wing B1331 · Wing B1333 · ESTC R5878

Title page: Princeton Theological Seminary Library copy, digitized by the Internet Archive (opens the Internet Archive in a new tab)

OF THE NATURE OF SPIRITS: › Section 29-31: Ad SECT. XXIX, XXX, XXXI.

Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.

[ Earlier:190–205 of 413

:190p. 82–83

1. I take not the word [Spirit] to be of univocal signification here, but so analogical as to be equivocal. God and Creatures are not univocally called [Spirits.] ⟨p. 83⟩2. I know not (and I think no other) that all Created Spirits in the universe are so far of one substantial consistence as that the word [Spirit] univocally fits them all, as a Genus among the 15 senses of the word before said mentioned by Martinius; when we confine it to one, men are apt to boggle at the ambiguity: yet when we have defined it, the name is to be used.

:191p. 83

3. Materia is as ambiguous as Spiritus; and is oft used for Res or Substantia, which is fundamental to modes and qualities and active forms: and oft for substance of such a consistence as is sensible (to the highest senses) and as a mind in the flesh can have an Idea of in its consistence; and if you will, such as you call Impenetrable and Discerpible.

:192p. 83

4. The word [substance] itself, if used only to signify, either Quoddity and not Quiddity; (as Ens for Quod est, and not Quid est, and subsistit for aliquid subsistit; not telling what) or relatively only for Quod substat accidentibus; or negatively for Quod non est accidens; sed aliquid subsistens in se, and include not the notion of Res fundamentalis, is not fit here to be used as a Genus; but in this sense it is.

4. The word [substance] itself, if used only to signifie, either Quoddity and not Quiddity; (as Ens for Quod est, and not Quid est, and subsistit for aliquid subsistit; not telling what) or relatively only for Quod substat accidentibus; or negatively for Quod non est accidens; sed aliquid subsistens in se, and include not the notion of Res fundamentalis, is not fit here to be used as a Genus; but in this sense it is.

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Position

Cited: :193
On this page: :190–205
Section: :184–207
Whole work: 413 passages

Cite

Richard Baxter, Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits.… (London, 1682), sect. 29-31, pp. 83–84. EEBO-TCP A26976.

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The book

Title as printed: Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits. Two discourses, one in a letter to an unknown doubter, the other in a reply to Dr. Henry Moore's Animadversions on a private letter to him, which he published in his second edition of Mr. Joseph Glanvil's Sadducismus triumphatus, or, History of apparitions by Richard Baxter.
Author: Richard Baxter 1615–1691
Place: London
Bookseller: B. Simons
Year: 1682
Size: [8], 3-72 p.
Words: 38,499
Catalogue: Wing B1331 · Wing B1333 · ESTC R5878
Text: EEBO-TCP A26976

Passages: 413
Sections: 29

The author

Richard Baxter 1615–1691

PuritansEngland

Pastor at Kidderminster and prolific nonconformist author.

Transcription key

:204p. 87–89

Who can doubt but God being all in all things, he is as intimate to us as our Souls to our bodies, and more: And tho the Schools commonly say, that God hath no Accidents, pardon my dissent who doubt not he hath the accidents of Relations, and dare not say that all the world is not Dei Accidens, while in him we live, and move, and have our being: for I will not, and I do not think that it is Pars Dei, as if he were but Anima mundi, and yet I will not say that the world hath no entity or substance; nor yet that the entity of God and the world, is more than the entity (or substance) of God alone; for to be Minor or Pars is below God. But Accidents though no parts are substantiae accidentia. And though I think the Fryar (Benedictus de Benedictis) in Regula Perfectionis speaketh fanatically when he taketh ⟨p. 88⟩it to be perfection to suppose we see and know no being but God; yet we must know nothing quite separate from God, and that hath not some dependent union with him. And yet while all things are in God, and so inseparable from him that nothing but annihilation can totally separate them, yet they are multitudes in themselves, and wicked Men and Devils are separated from the influx of his Grace and Glory. And the human nature of Christ hath some nearer union with God than other Creatures have. And so I doubt not but every Creature is so united to the universe, that nothing but annihilation can totally separate it from the rest; and yet this is consistent with individuation. I remember when I told him whom you so oft mention of Augustines words de Anima, in which he seemeth to favour the saying that [All Souls are one, and yet many] rather than that [All Souls are one and not many] or [many and not one] he seemed much taken with it: all which I mention to infer that there is a separability (from God and the universe) which is no way possible but by annihilation; and in compounds some separation of parts will change the species; and if it were provable which Aquinas holds, that no ⟨p. 89⟩two Angels are not of distinct Species, then every alteration of the individual might alter the Species; but yet it would be a Spirit.

Who can doubt but God being all in all things, he is as intimate to us as our Souls to our bodies, and more: And tho the Schools commonly say, that God hath no Accidents, pardon my dissent who doubt not he hath the accidents of Relations, and dare not say that all the world is not Dei Accidens, while in him we live, and move, and have our being: for I will not, and I do not think that it is Pars Dei, as if he were but Anima mundi, and yet I will not say that the world hath no entity or substance; nor yet that the entity of God and the world, is more than the entity (or substance) of God alone; for to be Minor or Pars is below God. But Accidents though no parts are substantiae accidentia. And though I think the Fryar (Benedictus de Benedictis) in Regula Perfectionis speaketh fanatically when he taketh ⟨p. 88⟩it to be perfection to suppose we see and know no being but God; yet we must know nothing quite separate from God, and that hath not some dependent union with him. And yet while all things are in God, and so inseparable from him that nothing but annihilation can totally separate them, yet they are multitudes in themselves, and wicked Men and Devils are separated from the influx of his Grace and Glory. And the human nature of Christ hath some nearer union with God than other Creatures have. And so I doubt not but every Creature is so united to the universe, that nothing but annihilation can totally separate it from the rest; and yet this is consistent with individuation. I remember when I told him whom you so oft mention of Augustines words de Anima, in which he seemeth to favour the saying that [All Souls are one, and yet many] rather than that [All Souls are one and not many] or [many and not one] he seemed much taken with it: all which I mention to infer that there is a separability (from God and the universe) which is no way possible but by annihilation; and in compounds some separation of parts will change the species; and if it were proveable which Aquinas holds, that no ⟨p. 89⟩two Angels are not of distinct Species, then every alteration of the individual might alter the Species; but yet it wo'd be a Spirit.