A26976:235
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits.…
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits. Two discourses, one in a letter to an unknown doubter, the other in a reply to Dr. Henry Moore's Animadversions on a private letter to him, which he published in his second edition of Mr. Joseph Glanvil's Sadducismus triumphatus, or, History of apparitions by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for B. Simons, 1682
OF THE NATURE OF SPIRITS: › Section 33-34: Ad SECT. XXXIII, XXXIV.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But may not this extension and Indivisibility also be omitted as too hard, without all the mischief mentioned by you, and a truer notifying Form found out?
But may not this extension and Indivisibili•y also be omitted as too hard, without all the mischief mentioned by you, and a truer notifying Form found out?
Let us hear your self, p. 359. [To prevent all such Cavils we shall omit the Spinosities of the Extension or Indivisibility of a Soul or Spirit, and conclude briefly thus: That the manifold Contradictions and Repugnancies we find in the nature of matter, to be able to either think or spontaneously to move itself, do well assure us that these operations belong not to it, but to some other substance: Wherefore we finding those operations in us, it is manifest that we have in us an immaterial Being really distinct from the Body, which we ordinarily call a Soul: The speculation of whose bare Essence, though it may well puzzle us, yet those properties that we find incompatible to a Body, do sufficiently inform us of the different Nature thereof: for it is plain she is a Substance endued with the power of Cogitation, that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects, as also of penetrating and spontaneously moving of a Body; which properties are as immediate to her as impenetrability and separability of parts to the matter, and we are not to demand the cause of the one any more than of the other.]
Let us hear your self, p. 359. [To prevent all such Cavils we shall omit the Spinosities of the Extension or Indivisibility of a Soul or Spirit, and conclude briefly thus: That the manifold Contradictions and Repugnancies we find in the nature of matter, to be able to either think or spontaneously to move itself, do well assure us that these operations belong not to it, but to some other substance: Wherefore we finding those operations in us, it is manifest that we have in us an immaterial Being really distinct from the Body, which we ordinarily call a Soul: The speculation of whose bare Essence, though it may well puzzle us, yet those properties that we find incompetible to a Body, do sufficiently inform us of the different Nature thereof: for it is plain she is a Substance indued with the power of Cogitation, that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects, as also of penetrating and spontaneously moving of a Body; which properties are as immediate to her as impenetrability and separability of parts to the matter, and we are not to demand the cause of the one any more than of the other.]