A26976:238
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits.…
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits. Two discourses, one in a letter to an unknown doubter, the other in a reply to Dr. Henry Moore's Animadversions on a private letter to him, which he published in his second edition of Mr. Joseph Glanvil's Sadducismus triumphatus, or, History of apparitions by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for B. Simons, 1682
OF THE NATURE OF SPIRITS: › Section 33-34: Ad SECT. XXXIII, XXXIV.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And if voluntary Motion be proper to a Spirit, I think mere Fire (Solar or Ethereal) is no Spirit; But if all self-moving Power be proper to a Spirit, Fire is a Spirit. And from the Form will I denominate, while you oft tell us, that the Essence of Substance is unknown. (By Essence meaning somewhat else than that which I can fully prove to be the Form.
And if voluntary Motion be proper to a Spirit, I think meer Fire (Solar or Aethereal) is no Spirit; But if all self-moving Power be proper to a Spirit, Fire is a Spirit. And from the Form will I denominate, while you oft tell us, that the Essence of Substance is unknown. (By Essence meaning somwhat else than that which I can fully prove to be the Form.
To conclude, there are these different Opinions before us.
I. That the whole Entity or Conceptus realis of a Spirit is Virtus vitalis, and is mera sorma, ⟨p. 99⟩or rather simplex actus Entitativus; and that substantia is added not as a partial real Conceptus, but as respective, to notify that this Virtus vitalis is no Accident, but a thing that may subsist of itself. Some hold this true only of God, and some of all Spirits: If this be true, your notions of Penetrability and Indivisibility are most easily defended.
I. That the whole Entity or Conceptus realis of a Spirit is Virtus vitalis, and is mera sorma, ⟨p. 99⟩or rather simplex actus Entitativus; and that substantia is added not as a partial real Conceptus, but as respective, to notifie that this Virtus vitalis is no Accident, but a thing that may subsist of itself. Some hold this true only of God, and some of all Spirits: If this be true, your notions of Penetrability and Indivisibility are most easily defended.