A26976:54
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits.…
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits. Two discourses, one in a letter to an unknown doubter, the other in a reply to Dr. Henry Moore's Animadversions on a private letter to him, which he published in his second edition of Mr. Joseph Glanvil's Sadducismus triumphatus, or, History of apparitions by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for B. Simons, 1682
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. In the three passive Elements, Earth, Water and Air, there is in each, 1. The Matter, 2. The Disposition of that matter by contexture, and various modes, of which Impenetrability and Divisibility are parts; 3. The passive Form resulting from all these, which consisteth in their various aptitude to their uses; especially their Receptivity of the Influx of the Active Natures. Here you put two Attributes together, which are both but parts of the Materiae Dispositio, and call them two the Form.
II. In the Active Natures, there is, 1. The Substantiality, 2. The Substantiae Dispositio, 3. The Form.
Of the first (not part, but) inadequate Conceptus, Substantiality, we agree, of the second Conceptus we differ: That such Substances have an incomprehensible Purity, of which we can have no distinct Idea for want of Sensation, but a General Conception only; and that this Purity (whatever it be) is not the Form of Spirits, but the Substantiae Dispositio, is that which I say: And you say that Penetrability and Indivisibility are the Form, which (at most) are but the Dispositio Substantiae; and yet you join the Vital Virtue as part of the formal Conception too, ⟨p. 20⟩which is quite of another conception. And so we differ of the third Conceptus, viz. the Form also; which I affirm of all simple active natures to be the Virtus Activa: And if they are Vital, the Virtus Vitalis.
Of the first (not part, but) inadequate Conceptus, Substantiality, we agree, of the second Conceptus we differ: That such Substances have an incomprehensible Purity, of which we can have no distinct Idea for want of Sensation, but a General Conception only; and that this Purity (whatever it be) is not the Form of Spirits, but the Substantiae Dispositio, is that which I say: And you say that Penetrability and Indivisibility are the Form, which (at most) are but the Dispositio Substantiae; and yet you joyn the Vital Virtue as part of the formal Conception too,