A26976:56
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits.…
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits. Two discourses, one in a letter to an unknown doubter, the other in a reply to Dr. Henry Moore's Animadversions on a private letter to him, which he published in his second edition of Mr. Joseph Glanvil's Sadducismus triumphatus, or, History of apparitions by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for B. Simons, 1682
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Of the first (not part, but) inadequate Conceptus, Substantiality, we agree, of the second Conceptus we differ: That such Substances have an incomprehensible Purity, of which we can have no distinct Idea for want of Sensation, but a General Conception only; and that this Purity (whatever it be) is not the Form of Spirits, but the Substantiae Dispositio, is that which I say: And you say that Penetrability and Indivisibility are the Form, which (at most) are but the Dispositio Substantiae; and yet you join the Vital Virtue as part of the formal Conception too, ⟨p. 20⟩which is quite of another conception. And so we differ of the third Conceptus, viz. the Form also; which I affirm of all simple active natures to be the Virtus Activa: And if they are Vital, the Virtus Vitalis.
Of the first (not part, but) inadequate Conceptus, Substantiality, we agree, of the second Conceptus we differ: That such Substances have an incomprehensible Purity, of which we can have no distinct Idea for want of Sensation, but a General Conception only; and that this Purity (whatever it be) is not the Form of Spirits, but the Substantiae Dispositio, is that which I say: And you say that Penetrability and Indivisibility are the Form, which (at most) are but the Dispositio Substantiae; and yet you joyn the Vital Virtue as part of the formal Conception too, ⟨p. 20⟩which is quite of another conception. And so we differ of the third Conceptus, viz. the Form also; which I affirm of all simple active natures to be the Virtus Activa: And if they are Vital, the Virtus Vitalis.
Of the name Vita, there is a Controversy, which must be distinguished from that de re. If it be true that Dr. Glisson saith, that every Atom of matter hath in it a Motive Principle without Composition, then the Motive Virtue is the Form of all Matter as well as of Spirit. If all be to be called Living or Spirit, which hath a Virtus Motiva for its Essential Form, then Ignis (or Aether) is Vital and Spirit; for it hath an Essential Motive Principle as its Form. Therefore the Question whether Ignis or Aether) be Life or Spirit, is but a question de nomine (such as too many usually in Disputes manage, as if it were de re.) It is no Life or Spirit, if by those names you mean only Sensitive and Intellectual Natures: But it is Life and Spirit, if by that name you mean only an Essential Formal Motive Principle.