A26976:75
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits.…
Of the immortality of mans soul, and the nature of it and other spirits. Two discourses, one in a letter to an unknown doubter, the other in a reply to Dr. Henry Moore's Animadversions on a private letter to him, which he published in his second edition of Mr. Joseph Glanvil's Sadducismus triumphatus, or, History of apparitions by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for B. Simons, 1682
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But I confess I am too dull to be sure that God cannot endue matter itself with the formal Virtue of Perception: That you say the Cartesians hold the contrary, and that your Writings prove it, certifieth me not. O the marvellous difference of mens Conceptions! Such great Wits as Campanella, Dr. Glisson, &c. were confident that no Matter in the world was without the una-trina Virtus, viz. Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive; I agree not with them: But you on the contrary say, that Materia qualitercunque modificata is uncapable of Perception. I doubt not, materia qua materia, or yet qua mere modificata hath no Life: But that it is ⟨p. 29⟩uncapable of it; and that Almighty God cannot make perceptive living Matter, and that by informing it without mixture, I cannot prove, nor I think you: Where is the Contradiction that makes it impossible? Nor do I believe that it giveth a man any more cause to doubt (as you add) of the Existence of God, or the Immortality of the Soul, than your Opinion that saith, God cannot do this.
But I confess I am too dull to be sure that God cannot endue matter itself with the formal Virtue of Perception: That you say the Cartesians hold the contrary, and that your Writings prove it, certifieth me not. O the marvellous difference of mens Conceptions! Such great Wits as Campanella, Dr. Glisson, &c. were confident that no Matter in the world was without the una-trina Virtus, viz. Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive; I agree not with them: But you on the contrary say, that Materia qualitercunque modificata is uncapable of Perception. I doubt not, materia qua materia, or yet qua mere modificata hath no LIfe: But that it is ⟨p. 29⟩uncapable of it; and that Almighty God cannot make perceptive living Matter, and that by informing it without mixture, I cannot prove, nor I think you: Where is the Contradiction that makes it impossible? Nor do I believe that it giveth a man any more cause to doubt (as you add) of the Existence of God, or the Immortality of the Soul, than your Opinion that saith, God cannot do this.