A27004:2099
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
12. I meet with none of them who dare deny this God to be an intellectual free Agent; so that though it be granted them, that intelligere, veil be not in God the same thing formally as it is in man; yet is it something which eminently must be so called; man having no fitter conception or expression of it, than from these acts of his own soul. Epicurus will not make God defectively ignorant, impotent, or bad. When themselves divide all things into such as have understanding, and such as have none; of which part do they suppose GOD to stand? Things that are void of understanding, (formally or eminently) are below the dignity of things that have understanding. So that they confess there is existent an incorporeal, intelligent, free Agent.
12. I meet with none of them who dare deny this God to be an intellectual free Agent; so that though it be granted them, that intelligere, velle be not in God the same thing formally as it is in man; yet is it something which eminently must be so called; man having no fitter conception or expression of it, than from these acts of his own soul. Epicurus will not make God defectively ignorant, impotent, or bad. When themselves divide all things into such as have understanding, and such as have none; of which part do they suppose GOD to stand? Things that are void of understanding, (formally or eminently) are below the dignity of things that have understanding. So that they confess there is existent an incorporeal, intelligent, free Agent.
- 1If the soul be nothing but Matter and Motion, then no man is the same this year as he was the last. For Matter is in fluxu continuo, as they object themselves anon: We have not the same flesh and blood to day which we lately had: and the motion of this instant is not the same with the motion which succeedeth in the next: So that no man's soul, and consequently no man, is long the same: and so (as I have said after) Kings will lose their titles to their Crowns, and all men to their lands, as being not the same who were born heirs to them. And there must be no rewards or punishments, unless you will reward and punish one for another's faults: And they need no more to fear the pain or death which will befall them, than that which befall their neighbour, because it is not the man that now is who must undergo it. Nor should any man have a wife or child of his own one year together. If they like not these consequents, let them either prove that Identifying Matter and Motion are permanent, or grant that some other permanent thing doth identify the person. See this as the argument of Ammonius and Numenias, prest by Nemesius de Anim. c. 2. p. 477. Vid. & Clean this argumenta pro animae corporeitate à Nemesio profligata ibid. p. 479 &c.