A27004:2129
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Perhaps you will say with him in Cicer. de Nat. Deor. that by this argument God must be a Fiddler, because he maketh men that are such. Answ. By this argument no fiddler, nor any other man, hath more wisdom than God, or can do that which God cannot do: but because God is above him in his skill, doth it follow that the names which signify humane imperfection must be put on God? Can God enable a man to that which he is not able to do himself, and can he give that which he hath not to give?
Perhaps you will say with him in Cicer. de Nat. Deor. that by this argument God must be a Fidler, because he maketh men that are such. Answ. By this argument no fidler, nor any other man, hath more wisdom than God, or can do that which God cannot do: but because God is above him in his skill, doth it follow that the names which signifie humane imperfection must be put on God? Can God enable a man to that which he is not able to do himself, and can he give that which he hath not to give?
Object. None of the parts of a clock can tell the hour of the day, and yet all set together can: and none of the letters of a book are Philosophy, and yet the whole may be a learned system: ⟨p. 515⟩and no atoms in a Lute can make melody, as the whole can do.
Answ. This is but to play with words. In all these instances the whole hath nothing of a higher kind in nature than the several parts, but only a composition by the contribution of each part. The clock telleth you nothing but per modum signi; and that signum is only in the sound, or order of motion. And sound and motion belongeth to the whole, by virtue or contribution of the parts, and is not another thing above them. And that the motion is so ordered, and that man can by it collect the time of the day, is from the power of our understandings, and not from the matter of the engine at all. So the book is no otherwise Philosophy at all, but per modum signi: which signum is related to mans understanding both as the cause and orderer, and as the receiver and apprehender. So that the letters do nothing at all, but passively serve the mind of man. And so it is in the other instance: the strings do but move the air, and cause the sound which is in the ear: that this is melody, is caused only by the mind of man, who first frameth, and then orderly moveth them, and then suo modo receiveth the sound, and maketh melody by the aptitude of his apprehension. If you had proved that Clock, or Book, or Lute do make themselves, and order and use themselves, and know the time, or understand or delight in themselves, you had done something. But by the deceitful names of Philosophy and Melody, to confound the bare natural sound and sign, with that ordering and that reception, which is the privilege of a mind, is unfit for a Philosopher.