A27004:2198
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
3 And thus I deny the major Proposition. And I prove the contrary. 1. God is the first principle of all motion in the world, and the first cause of material motion, and yet is not material. 2. What the lower and baser nature can do, that the higher and nobler hath power to do, (suppositis supponendis) therefore if a body can move a body, a soul can do it much more.
But, saith Gassendus, Causis secundis primum agendi principium est Atomorum varia mobilitas ingenita, non incorporea aliqua substantia. Answ. Angels are causae secundae, souls are causae secundae, animated bodies of men are causae secundae: prove it now of any of these (in your exclusion) if you can. But he saith, Capere non licet quomodo si incorporeum sit, ita applicari corpori valeat, ut illi impulsum imprimat; quando noque ipsum contingere, carens ipsa tactu seu mole quae tangat, non potest — Physicae actiones corporeae cum sint, nisi à principio physico corporeoque elici non possiut — Quod anima autem humana incorporea cum sit▪ & in ipsum tamen corpus suum agat, motumque ipsi imprimat, dicimus animam humanam qua est intellectus seu mens, atque adeo incorporea, non elicere actiones nisi intellectuales, seu mentales & incorporeas. Et quum est sentiens, vegetans, praeditaque vi corporum motrice atque adeo corporea est, elicere actiones corporeas, &c. And of Angels and Devils he saith, That it is known by faith only that they are incorporeal, and perhaps God gave them extraordinary bodies, when he would have them move or act on bodies.
To this I answer, 1. Who gave those atoms their ingenite mobility, and how? You say that captum omnem fugit ut ⟨p. 542⟩quippiam aliud moveat, si in seipso immotum maneat. If so, then it seemeth, that either God was moved when he moved atoms, or that he never moved them. How then came they to be moved first? But you confess that God put into them their mobility. You say, De Deo alia ratio est, quoniam infinitae virtutis cum sit, & vique praesens, non ullo si motu, sed nutu solo agere & movere quidlibet potest. If you think not as you speak, it is unworthy of a Philosopher; if you do, then it is strange that you should overthrow your own reasoning, and excuse it no better than thus. If the reason why incorporeal spirits cannot move bodies be that which you allege, (because only a body can be applied to a body to make impression on it) then God can less move a body than man's soul can; because his purest essence is more distant from corporeal grossness than our souls are. At least, the reason would be the same. And to say that God is every where, and of infinite virtues, maketh him nevertheless a Spirit: and created spirits (if that be enough) may have power or virtue enough for such an effect. Doubtless if God move bodies, the spirituality of an agent hindereth not the motion.