A27004:2218
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
There is nothing in the Intellect which was not first in the Sense, from which it receiveth all its knowledge by the Idea's of the Fantasy; Therefore the Soul can reach no higher than to corporeal sensible things: Therefore it is but such it self.
THere is nothing in the Intellect which was not first in the Sense, from which it receiveth all its knowledge by the Idea's of the Phantasie; Therefore the Soul can reach no higher than to corporeal sensible things: Therefore it is but such it self.
Answ. The Antecedent is false, and both the Consequents. Had he limited his assertions to corporeal objects, I should easily acknowledge to Gassendus, that Omnis quae in mente habetur Idea ortum ducit à sensibus. Et Omnis Id•a aut per sensum transit, aut ex iis quae transeunt per sensum formatur. Et quae Idea propriis acquiritur sensibus persectior est eâ quae ex facta ab alio descriptione formatur. Qualis Idea rei, talis definitio. But that these things will not hold true as he delivereth them universally, I think I shall make plain, and confute this Objection to the satisfaction of any one that knoweth himself.
Ortum ducere à sensu is an ambiguous phrase: The sense may be the Occasion sine qua non, of that whereof it never had the least participation in it self. I desire you but to distinguish between the Intellects Object and its Act, and those Objects which it knoweth by the mediation of other extrinsic objects, and those which it knoweth by the mediation of its own Act. These differences are past all doubt. When the eye seeth these Lines and this Paper, the Light and Lines and Paper are each one thing, and the sight of them is another. I see the Light, and thereby the Paper; but I see not my sight: My sight is not the object of my sight: It may be said, that the Object is in my sight, but not that my sight is in my sight: Yet by seeing I perceive not only what I see, but that I see; and I perceive much more plainly that I see, than what I see. I may doubt of a thousand objects which I see, what matter, shape, or colour they are of; but I doubt not at all of the act of seeing; that right or wrong some fight I have, or that I see the Light: so is it with the Intellect. This book is one thing, and the understanding it is another thing. The book is the object of my understanding; but (at least in