A27004:2220
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Ortum ducere à sensu is an ambiguous phrase: The sense may be the Occasion sine qua non, of that whereof it never had the least participation in it self. I desire you but to distinguish between the Intellects Object and its Act, and those Objects which it knoweth by the mediation of other extrinsic objects, and those which it knoweth by the mediation of its own Act. These differences are past all doubt. When the eye seeth these Lines and this Paper, the Light and Lines and Paper are each one thing, and the sight of them is another. I see the Light, and thereby the Paper; but I see not my sight: My sight is not the object of my sight: It may be said, that the Object is in my sight, but not that my sight is in my sight: Yet by seeing I perceive not only what I see, but that I see; and I perceive much more plainly that I see, than what I see. I may doubt of a thousand objects which I see, what matter, shape, or colour they are of; but I doubt not at all of the act of seeing; that right or wrong some fight I have, or that I see the Light: so is it with the Intellect. This book is one thing, and the understanding it is another thing. The book is the object of my understanding; but (at least in ⟨p. 548⟩primò instanti) my understanding is not the object of my understanding; but by understanding I have an immediate perception that I understand. And (as Cartesius truly saith) the act of Intellection is more perceived than the object: I am more certain that I think and understand, than I am of the nature of that which I think of and understand. If any say, that the act of Intellection is the object of another Intellection, because intelligo me intelligere, and so that intellectio non est tantum actus intellectus, sed etiam est in intellectu, and that the Intellect doth understand its own act intuitivè as some speak, or by reflection as others (though doubtless the first perception that I understand, is not by reflection, but by that same act of understanding something else) (as sight doth not reflect upon it self to get a perception that I see) I will enter no controversy about any of these notions of the manner of our understanding our own act of Intellection, which doth not concern the present business. But it is most certain that Actus intelligendi nunquam fuit in sensu: when the object of Intellection did pass through the sense, the Act of Intellection did not:
Ortum ducere à sensu is an ambiguous phrase: The sense may be the Occasion sine qua non, of that whereof it never had the least participation in it self. I desire you but to distinguish between the Intellects Object and its Act, and those Objects which it knoweth by the mediation of other extrinsick objects, and those which it knoweth by the mediation of its own Act. These differences are past all doubt. When the eye seeth these Lines and this Paper, the Light and Lines and Paper are each one thing, and the sight of them is another. I see the Light, and thereby the Paper; but I see not my sight: My sight is not the object of my sight: It may be said, that the Object is in my sight, but not that my sight is in my sight: Yet by seeing I perceive not only what I see, but that I see; and I perceive much more plainly that I see, than what I see. I may doubt of a thousand objects which I see, what matter, shape, or colour they are of; but I doubt not at all of the act of seeing; that right or wrong some fight I have, or that I see the Light: so is it with the Intellect. This book is one thing, and the understanding it is another thing. The book is the object of my understanding; but (at least in