A27004:2222
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
D' Orbellis distinguisheth Knowledge (largely taken) into sensitivè & intellectivè: and both of them into Abstractivè & Intuitivè. Knowledge Intuitive is of an Object as it self present, when a thing in its present existence, is the moving object of knowledge. Knowledge Abstractive is when the species of the thing doth move us to know the thing it self: and that whether the thing it self be present or absent, and have existence or not. The example of Intuitive sensitive knowledge or perception which he giveth, is the Eye seeing Colours. The instance of Abstractive sensitive knowledge is, as the Fantasy imagineth colours: The instance of Intuitive Intellective Knowledge is, the Saints seeing the glory of God in Heaven, and he might have instanced in many other things: The instance of Abstractive Intellective Knowledge, is the understandings Knowledge of the Quiddity of Colours by means of the species. To which may be added, that Abstractive Knowledge is either per speciem propriam, or per speciem alienam: In this life the Soul knoweth its own acts either Intuitively or by an act, if possible, yet nearer to its essential power, that hath no usual distinguishing name. It knoweth its own powers, inclinations, and habits, neither by a knowledge, in proper and strict sense, intuitive or abstractive: For it is not by a proper species, but it is its natural innate power of discerning this Principle, that quicquid agit potest agere quod agit; by arguing ab actu ad potentiam & naturam. But in the large sense as Cartesius useth the word, this may be called, an Idea. The mind knoweth God and Angels, and other mens Souls, in this large sense also by an Idea, but not per speciem propriam, sed alienam, that is, not by a species of God and Angels, but by an Idea borrowed from our own Intellections and Volitions. But this is not an Idea that ever passed through the senses: and ⟨p. 550⟩Gassendus might have thought on it, whether it be not an Idea in the Intellect, if not without the fantasy, at least over and above the Idea in the Imagination, when he denieth that there is any such Intellective Idea's.
D' Orbellis distinguisheth Knowledge (largely taken) into sensitivè & intellectivè: and both of them into Abstractivè & Intuitivè. Knowledge Intuitive is of an Object as it self present, when a thing in its present existence, is the moving object of knowledge. Knowledge Abstractive is when the species of the thing doth move us to know the thing it self: and that whether the thing it self be present or absent, and have existence or not. The example of Intuitive sensitive knowledge or perception which he giveth, is the Eye seeing Colours. The instance of Abstractive sensitive knowledge is, as the Phantasie imagineth colours: The instance of Intuitive Intellective Knowledge is, the Saints seeing the glory of God in Heaven, and he might have instanced in many other things: The instance of Abstractive Intellective Knowledge, is the understandings Knowledge of the Quiddity of Colours by means of the species. To which may be added, that Abstractive Knowledge is either per speciem propriam, or per speciem alienam: In this life the Soul knoweth its own acts either Intuitively or by an act, if possible, yet neerer to its essential power, that hath no usual distinguishing name. It knoweth its own powers, inclinations, and habits, neither by a knowledge, in proper and strict sense, intuitive or abstractive: For it is not by a proper species, but it is its natural innate power of discerning this Principle, that quicquid agit potest agere quod agit; by arguing ab actu ad potentiam & naturam. But in the large sense as Cartesius useth the word, this may be called, an Idea. The minde knoweth God and Angels, and other mens Souls, in this large sense also by an Idea, but not per speciem propriam, sed alienam, that is, not by a species of God and Angels, but by an Idea borrowed from our own Intellections and Volitions. But this is not an Idea that ever passed through the senses: and