A27004:2225
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
OBJECTION X.
That which things corporeal work upon, is corporeal: for it cannot be conceived how bodies own work upon that which hath no body: But things corporeal work upon the soul: Ergo, it is it self corporeal.
THat which things corporeal work upon, is corporeal: for it cannot be conceived how bodies own work upon that which hath no body: But things corporeal work upon the soul: Ergo, it is it self corporeal.
Answ. 1. I largely before showed, that our uncertainty of the just consistence of Metaphysical matter, or incorporeal substance, doth make all such arguings to sound like dreams.
Answ. 1. I largely before shewed, that our uncertainty of the just consistence of Metaphysical matter, or incorporeal substance, doth make all such arguings to sound like dreams.
2. I have showed, that spiritual powers receive not impressions as dull matter doth, by a mere passive power: but by an activity and outgoing, it worketh indeed upon that which it receiveth, much more than any such matter can be said to work on it: nay, matter doth not properly work upon it at all, but only afford it matter to work upon, and occasion to exercise its active power. As the stone or tree doth not work upon the sight, but the sight by the help of light doth work upon it. As the eye can see a dung-hill, and yet be of a nobler kind, and God and Angels can know beasts and worms, and yet be incorporeal. So man can know things inanimate, and yet be animate; and things insensible, and yet be sensible; and things irrational, and yet be rational; and things corporeal, and yet be incorporeal. And this by the activity and extent of its power, and not by any passive debasing defectiveness at all.