All these are clear, undeniable, positive conceptions of the soul; which set together are thus much, that [The Mind or Soul of man is a noble Essence, above the reach and nature of sense, naturally potentiated and inclined, as an active being, to intellection, volition, and seeking after things celestial and everlasting, especially God himself, his ultimate end.] All this is positive, clear and sure. And you would think this enough, 1. If you did consider what Lud. Vives saith, that God hath given man a soul to use, rather than accurately to know; or to know so far as is necessary to use. As your child may have the use of his knife, or clock, or watch, or clothes, without knowing what metal they are made of, or how to compose and make the like, as long as he can but do that with them which is necessary to their use. Often saith Seneca, Necessaria ignoramus, quia superflua didicimus. 2. If your minds were not by sense deluded and captivated to such fixed idea's of things corporeal and gross, as to over-look all other beings, and measure all substance by such gross idea's. 3. If you well considered, that you know in any respect little more of things corporeal, and in some respects much less. Let us see wherein it is that you know more: either as to the sensible or insensible parts of such beings. As for the substances as such, you confess they are but per accidens, the objects of sense, and that as stripped of their accidents you have no positive true conception of them. And as for the accidents, you are no whit agreed either what they are, or how many. Of all things you are most unanimous in that of Quantity, moles, or extensions; but what a poor kind of knowledge is it, to know that this or that is quantum, and not to know what it is that is quantum. What light, colour, sapor, odour are, and what all the senses that perceive them, you are as much disagreed as if this age had been the first that had debated it. The same I may say both of Qualities in general, and of all other in particular, except figure, which ⟨p. 554⟩properly belongeth not to the predicament. Of all the rest there is the like disagreement; even time and place, which truly are nothing but entia rationis, are debased by you in the first place, and are two of Gassendus his four predicaments. About the number either of principles or elements, there is no agreement;
All these are clear, undeniable, positive conceptions of the soul; which set together are thus much, that [The Mind or Soul of man is a noble Essence, above the reach and nature of sense, naturally potentiated and inclined, as an active being, to intellection, volition, and seeking after things celestial and everlasting, especially God himself, his ultimate end.] All this is positive, clear and sure. And you would think this enough, 1. If you did consider what Lud. Vives saith, that God hath given man a soul to use, rather than accurately to know; or to know so far as is necessary to use. As your child may have the use of his knife, or clock, or watch, or cloaths, without knowing what metall they are made of, or how to compose and make the like, as long as he can but do that with them which is necessary to their use. Often saith Seneca, Necessaria ignoramus, quia superflua didicimus. 2. If your minds were not by sense deluded and captivated to such fixed idea's of things corporeal and gross, as to over-look all other beings, and measure all substance by such gross idea's. 3. If you well considered, that you know in any respect little more of things corporeal, and in some respects much less. Let us see wherein it is that you know more: either as to the sensible or insensible parts of such beings. As for the substances as such, you confess they are but per accidens, the objects of sense, and that as stripped of their accidents you have no positive true conception of them. And as for the accidents, you are no whit agreed either what they are, or how many. Of all things you are most unanimous in that of Quantity, moles, or extensions; but what a poor kind of knowledge is it, to know that this or that is quantum, and not to know what it is that is quantum. What light, colour, sapor, odor are, and what all the senses that perceive them, you are as much disagreed as if this age had been the first that had debated it. The same I may say both of Qualities in general, and of all other in particular, except figure, which ⟨p. 554⟩properly belongeth not to the predicament. Of all the rest there is the like disagreement; even time and place, which truly are nothing but entia rationis, are debased by you in the first place, and are two of Gassendus his four predicaments. About the number either of principles or elements, there is no agreement;