A27004:2373
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And nature it self telleth us, that he that would not rather be annihilated than the world should be annihilated, or would not lose his life and honour, to save the life, and honour, and felicity of King and Kingdom, is no good member of Civil Society, but a person blinded by selfishness and sensuality. Therefore man hath something above himself, and his own pleasure, to seek and to take pleasure in. How far you can congruously say, that you take pleasure in your pleasure, and so make your own pleasure the object, yea, the only ultimate object of it self, I shall not now stay to enquire. But certain I am, that though our love, which is our complacency in the beloved object, is our actus finalis, yet is it not the objectum finale to it self; but God himself, the infinite Good, is that final Object; and the Public Good is a more noble and excellent object than our own. And though it be truly our felicity to love God, yet we love him not chiefly because it is our felicity to love him, but because he is chiefly Good and Lovely; and then in the second instant, we love our own love, and delight even in our own delights. Indeed the sensitive life, as such, can seek nothing higher than its own delight: but the rational life is made to intend and prosecute that end, which reason telleth us is best, and to prefer that before our selves, which is better than our selves. And therefore the Epicurean opinion, which maketh Pleasure our highest end, doth show that the Sect is sensual and brutish, and have brought their reason into servitude to their appetites and lusts. And nature it self doth abhor the notion, when it is brought into the light; and will hear him with some horror who shall speak out and say, [God is not to be chiefly loved for himself, nor as he is best in himself, nor as my ultimate objective end, but only to be loved next my self, as a means to my felicity or pleasure, as meat, drink, ease, and sport, and lust are. And virtue or holiness is not to be loved chiefly for it self, that is, as it is the Image of God, and pleasing to him, but as it conduceth to my pleasure.] As Cicero excellently noteth, there is a great deal ⟨p. 600⟩of difference between these two; [To love virtue as virtue, and so to take pleasure in it because it is virtue;] and [To love virtue for pleasures sake, more than for its own:]
And nature it self telleth us, that he that would not rather be annihilated than the world should be annihilated, or would not lose his life and honour, to save the life, and honour, and felicity of King and Kingdom, is no good member of Civil Society, but a person blinded by selfishness and sensuality. Therefore man hath something above himself, and his own pleasure, to seek and to take pleasure in. How far you can congruously say, that you take pleasure in your pleasure, and so make your own pleasure the object, yea, the only ultimate object of it self, I shall not now stay to enquire. But certain I am, that though our love, which is our complacency in the beloved object, is our actus finalis, yet is it not the objectum finale to it self; but God himself, the infinite Good, is that final Object; and the Publick Good is a more noble and excellent object than our own. And though it be truly our felicity to love God, yet we love him not chiefly because it is our felicity to love him, but because he is chiefly Good and Lovely; and then in the second instant, we love our own love, and delight even in our own delights. Indeed the sensitive life, as such, can seek nothing higher than its own delight: but the rational life is made to intend and prosecute that end, which reason telleth us is best, and to prefer that before our selves, which is better than our selves. And therefore the Epicurean opinion, which maketh Pleasure our highest end, doth shew that the Sect is sensual and bruitish, and have brought their reason into servitude to their appetites and lusts. And nature it self doth abhor the notion, when it is brought into the light; and will hear him with some horrour who shall speak out and say, [God is not to be chiefly loved for himself, nor as he is best in himself, nor as my ultimate objective end, but only to be loved next my self, as a means to my felicity or pleasure, as meat, drink, ease, and sport, and lust are. And virtue or holiness is not to be loved chiefly for it self, that is, as it is the Image of God, and pleasing to him, but as it conduceth to my pleasure.] As Cicero excellently noteth, there is a great deal