A27004:2374
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
For he that doth so, must say as Cicero chargeth Epicurus plainly to say, that Luxury is not to be discommended if it be not unpleasant: for the end is the measure and rule to judge of all the means. If pleasure as pleasure be best, then to him that so continues it, to live more pleasedly in whoredom, and drunkenness, and theft, and murder, than in godliness and honesty, it will be better so to do: And virtue, and lust or wickedness, will stand in competition only in the point of pleasure. And then, which think you will have the greater party, and what a case would mankind be in? I am persuaded, that the well studying the excellent discourse of Cicero on this point, and the reasons which the Stoics and the rest of the Philosophers give against the Plebeian Philosophers, (as Cicero calleth them) may much conduce to help many Divines themselves to a righter understanding of the same controversy, as in Theology they have otherwise worded it, Whether God or our own felicity be most to be loved? (And yet without running into the fanatic extreme, of separating the love of God and our selves, and calling men to try whether for his glory they can be willing to be damned.) Only when you read the Philosopher saying, that virtue in and for it self is to be loved as our felicity; elucidate it by remembering, that this is, because that virtue in it self is the Image of God, and by our felicity they mean the perfection of our natures, in respect of the end for which we were made. And that as the excellency of my knife or pen (yea, or my horse) is not to be measured by their own pleasure but their usefulness to me, because I am their end; so is it, as to man's perfection, as he is made for God, and related to him, (for all that he hath no need of us, seeing he can be pleased in us.) Thus this Philosophical controversy is coincident with one of the greatest in Theology.
For he that doth so, must say as Cicero chargeth Epicurus plainly to say, that Luxury is not to be discommended if it be not unpleasant: for the end is the measure and rule to judge of all the means. If pleasure as pleasure be best, then to him that so continues it, to live more pleasedly in whoredom, and drunkenness, and theft, and murder, than in godliness and honesty, it will be better so to do: And virtue, and lust or wickedness, will stand in competition only in the point of pleasure. And then, which think you will have the greater party, and what a case would mankind be in? I am perswaded, that the well studying the excellent discourse of Cicero on this point, and the reasons which the Stoicks and the rest of the Philosophers give against the Plebeian Philosophers, (as Cicero calleth them) may much conduce to help many Divines themselves to a righter understanding of the same controversie, as in Theology they have otherwise worded it, Whether God or our own felicity be most to be loved? (And yet without running into the fanatick extreme, of separating the love of God and our selves, and calling men to try whether for his glory they can be willing to be damned.) Only when you read the Philosopher saying, that virtue in and for it self is to be loved as our felicity; elucidate it by remembring, that this is, because that vertue in it self is the Image of God, and by our felicity they mean the perfection of our natures, in respect of the end for which we were made. And that as the excellency of my knife or pen (yea, or my horse) is not to be measured by their own pleasure but their usefulness to me, because I am their end; so is it, as to man's perfection, as he is made for God, and related to him, (for all that he hath no need of us, seeing he can be pleased in us.) Thus this Philosophical controversie is coincident with one of the greatest in Theologie.