A27004:2377
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The same name he vouchsafeth them that hold, That the Scripture is known by universal tradition to be God's word, and every mans own reason must tell him (or discern) the meaning of it. And he concludeth, that if every one may expound the Scripture, even in fundamentals, then every man may plead against all Magistrates, in defence of murder or any other crime, as a rational plea; and say, Why should you punish me for that which God hath bid me do. As if God would have no reasonable creature, but brutes only to be his subjects. As if a man could knowingly obey a Law, which he neither knoweth, nor must know the meaning of; and is bound to do he knoweth not what. And as if the Kings subjects must not understand the meaning of the fifth Commandment, nor of Rom. 13. Honour thy father and mother; and, Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, and not resist. Or as if Kings must govern only dogs and swine, or might make murder, adultery, idolatry and perjury, the duty of all their subjects when they pleased, because none must judge of the meaning of God's Law by which they are forbidden: or as if it were the only way to make men obedient to Kings and Parents, to have no understanding that God commandeth any man to obey them, nor to know any Law of God that doth require it: or as if all our Pastors and Teachers were not to be so useful to us as a sign-post; nor we were not to learn of them or of our Parents any thing, that God either by nature or Scripture ever taught us: or as if a child or subject, who is required to learn the meaning of his Ruler's Laws, to judge of them judicio privatae discretionis, were thereby allowed to mis-understand them, and to say that they command us that which they forbid us; and because the King forbiddeth us to murder, he alloweth us to say, You proposed it to my understanding, and I understand it that you bid me murder, and therefore you may not punish me. As if he that is bound to judge by a bare discerning what is commanded him, and what forbidden, were allowed to judge, in partem utramlibet, that it is or it is not, as please himself. As if when the King hath printed his Statutes, he had forfeited all his authority by so doing, and his subjects might say, Why do you punish us for disobeying your Laws, when you promulgated them to us as rational ⟨p. 603⟩creatures to discern their sense?
The same name he vouchsafeth them that hold, That the Scripture is known by universal tradition to be God's word, and every mans own reason must tell him (or discern) the meaning of it. And he concludeth, that if every one may expound the Scripture, even in fundamentals, then every man may plead against all Magistrates, in defence of murder or any other crime, as a rational plea; and say, Why should you punish me for that which God hath bid me do. As if God would have no reasonable creature, but bruits only to be his subjects. As if a man could knowingly obey a Law, which he neither knoweth, nor must know the meaning of; and is bound to do he knoweth not what. And as if the Kings subjects must not understand the meaning of the fifth Commandment, nor of