A27004:240
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…
The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural evidence the being of God ... : the second part, of Christianity, proving by evidence supernatural and natural, the certain truth of the Christian belief ... / by Richard Baxter ... ; also an appendix defending the soul's immortality against the Somatists or Epicureans and other pseudo-philosophers.
London: printed by R. White for Fran. Titon, 1667
Part 1 › Chapter 5: What this Cause is, in it self. That it is God.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1I shall now give no other instance, than in two of the most noble Creatures. The Soul of Man, which is made after Gods Image; from whence we fetch our first knowledge of him, hath in the unity of a living Spirit, the three foresaid faculties, of vital and executive Power, Understanding and Will, which are neither three species, nor three parts, nor three accidents of the Soul: But three faculties certainly so far distinct, as that the Acts from whence they are denominated really differ, and therefore the faculties differ at least in their Virtual Relation to those acts, and so in a well-grounded denomination.2 To understand is not to will: for I understand that which I have no will to, even against my will (for the Intellect may be forced: Therefore the same ⟨p. 31⟩Soul hath in it the virtue or power both of understanding and willing, and so of executing:3 which are denominated from the different acts which they relate to. There is some Reason in the powers, virtues, or faculties of the real difference in the acts.
1I shall now give no other instance, than in two of the most noble Creatures. The Soul of Man, which is made after Gods Image; from whence we fetch our first knowledge of him, hath in the unity of a living Spirit, the three foresaid faculties, of vital and executive Power, Ʋnderstanding and Will, which are neither three species, nor three parts, nor three accidents of the Soul: But three faculties certainly so far distinct, as that the Acts from whence they are denominated really differ, and therefore the faculties differ at least in their Virtual Relation to those acts, and so in a well-grounded denomination.2 To understand is not to will: for I understand that which I have no will to, even against my will (for the Intellect may be forced: Therefore the same ⟨p. 31⟩Soul hath in it the virtue or power both of understanding and willing, and so of executing: