The reasons of the Christian religion the first part, of godliness, proving by natural…

40. And all this is done voluntarily, without constraint, by a rational free-agent, in the open light, and for a thing of nought. Besides what Christians only can discern, all this the light of Nature doth reveal to be in the malignity of sin.

§. 8. Sin being certainly no better a thing than is here described, it is most certain that it deserveth punishment.

§. 9. And reason telleth us, ¹that God being the Governor of the world, and perfect Government being his perfect work and glory in that relation, it is not meet that in such a Divine and perfect Government so odious an evil be put up, and such contempt of God and all that is good be past by without such execution of his Laws as is sufficient to demonstrate the justice of the Governor, and to vindicate his Laws and authority from contempt: nor that it be pardoned on any terms, but such as shall sufficiently attain the ends of perfect Government.

§. 9. And reason telleth us, ¹that God being the Governour of the world, and perfect Government being his perfect work and glory in that relation, it is not meet that in such a Divine and perfect Government so odious an evil be put up, and such contempt of God and all that is good be past by without such execution of his Laws as is sufficient to demonstrate the justice of the Governour, and to vindicate his Laws and authority from contempt: nor that it be pardoned on any terms, but such as shall sufficiently attain the ends of perfect Government.

1. 1Sceleris etiam poena tristis, & praeter eos eventus qui sequuntur, per se maxima est. Cic. 2. de leg.

¹1. It is true, that as the immediate sense of the Precept (e.g. Thou shalt do no murder) is not de eventu, [it shall not come to pass] but de debito, [Thy duty is to forbear it]; So also the immediate sense of the Penal part is not de eventu, (e. g I thou murder thou shalt be put to death) but de debito, death shall be thy due, thou shalt be Reus mortis: So that if it do non evenire, it is not presently a falsehood. But its as true,² that when the Sovereign makes a Law, he thereby declareth that this Law is a Rule of Righteousness, that it is Norma officii & judicii: that the Subject must do according to it,³ and expect to be done by according to it: that it is the Instrument of Government. Therefore these two things are declared by it. 1. That ordinarily Judgment and execution shall pass according to it. 2. That it shall never be extraordinarily dispensed with, by Sovereignty, but upon terms which as well declare the Justice of the Governor, and discourage offenders from contempt, and are as fit to preserve the common good, and the honour of the Sovereign. So that thus far a Law doth assert also the event; which I put to prevent objections, and to show that truth and justice require the ordinary execution of just and necessary Laws.

¹1. It is true, that as the immediate sense of the Precept (e.g. Thou shalt do no murder) is not de eventu, [it shall not come to pass] but de debito, [Thy duty is to forbear it]; So also the immediate sense of the Penal part is not de eventu, (e. g I thou murder thou shalt be put to death) but de debito, death shall be thy due, thou shalt be Reus mortis: So that if it do non evenire, it is not presently a falshood. But its as true,² that when the Sovereign makes a Law, he thereby declareth that this Law is a Rule of Righteousness, that it is Norma officii & judicii: that the Subject must do according to it,³ and expect to be done by according to it: that it is the Instrument of Government. Therefore these two things are declared by it. 1. That ordinarily Judgment and execution shall pass according to it. 2. That it shall never be extraordinarily dispensed with, by Sovereignty, but upon terms which as well declare the Justice of the Governour, and discourage offendors from contempt, and are as fit to preserve the common good, and the honour of the Sovereign. So that thus far a Law doth assert also the event; which I put to prevent objections, and to shew that truth and justice require the ordinary execution of just and necessary Laws.

1. 1[Greek or Hebrew]. M•nd.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. M•nd.
2. 2Nemo ma•us felix. J•ve•.
3. 3Malo benefacere tantundem est periculum, quantum bono malefacere. Plaut. Pen.

¹2. And should they be ordinarily dispensed with, it would intimate, that the Ruler did he knew not what in making them; that he repented of them a unjust; or over-saw himself in them; or fore-saw not inconveniences; or was not able to see them executed: it would also make him seem a deceiver, that affrighted Subjects with that which he never intended to do; which Omnipotency, Omniscience and perfect Goodness cannot do, what ever impotent ignorant bad men may do.

1. 1Noxiae par poena esto, ut in suo vitio quisque plectatur. Cic. 3. de leg. Injusti judicis est bene agentem non remunerare, & negligentem non corripere. Sen. de benef. Turpe quid ansurus, te, sine teste, time. Anson. Veterem ferendo injuriam, invitas novam. Gel. Noc. Attic. l. 28.Noxiae par poena esto, ut in suo vitio quisque plectatur. Cic. 3. de leg. Injusti judicis est bene agentem non remunerare, & negligentem non corripere. Sen. de benef. Turpe quid ansurus, te, sine teste, time. Anson. Veterem ferendo injuriam, invitas novam. Gell. Noc. Attic. l. 28.

3. And the offender must be disabled (when penitency showeth not the change of his heart) that he do so no more: and therefore death is ordinarily inflicted.

3. And the offendor must be disabled (when penitency sheweth not the change of his heart) that he do so no more: and therefore death is ordinarily inflicted.

4. And especially offences must be prevented, and the honour of the Sovereign and safety of the people be preserved: If Laws be not executed, they and the Law-giver will be despised; others will be let loose, and invited to do evil, and no man's right will have any security by the Law. Therefore it is a Principle in Politics, that Poena debetur reipublicae; it is the Common-wealth to which the punishment of offenders is due, that is, it is a means which the Ruler oweth them for their security. And Cato was wont to say, See mall pro collato beneficio nullam reportare gratiam, quàm pro maleficio perpetrato non dare poenam. Plutar. Apoth. Rom. He had rather miss of thanks for his kindnesses and gifts, than of punishment for his faults. And was wont to say, that Magistratus qui maleficos prohibere possent, & tamen impunitate donarent, lapidibus ol ruendos esse, ut Reipub. perniciosissimos. A hundred such sayings are in Cicero, Offic. 3. Quotusquisque reperietur qui impunitate propositâ abstinere possit injuriâ. Impunitas peccandi maxima est illecebra: De Natur. Deor. 3. Nec domus, nec Respubl. stare potest, si in ea nec recte factis praemia extent ulla, nec supplicia peccatis. In Verrem 5. est utilius unius improbi supplicio multorum improbitatem coercere, quàm propter multos improbos uni parcere. Offic. 1. Non satis est eum qui lacesserit, injuriae suae penitere; ut ipse nequid tale posthac committat, & caeteri sint ad injuriam tardiores. This is the common sense of all that know what it is to govern.

4. And especially offences must be prevented, and the honour of the Sovereign and safety of the people be preserved: If Laws be not executed, they and the Law-giver will be despised; others will be let loose, and invited to do evil, and no man's right will have any security by the Law. Therefore it is a Principle in Politicks, that Poena debetur reipublicae; it is the Common-wealth to which the punishment of offendors is due, that is, it is a means which the Ruler oweth them for their security. And Cato was wont to say, Se malle pro collato beneficio nullam reportare gratiam, quàm pro maleficio perpetrato non dare poenam. Plutar. Apoth. Rom. He had rather miss of thanks for his kindnesses and gifts, than of punishment for his faults. And was wont to say, that Magistratus qui maleficos prohibere possent, & tamen impunitate donarent, lapidibus ol ruendos esse, ut Reipub. perniciosissimos. A hundred such sayings are in Cicero, Offic. 3. Quotusquisque reperietur qui impunitate propositâ abstinere possit injuriâ. Impunitas peccandi maxima est illecebra: De Natur. Deor. 3. Nec domus, nec Respubl. stare potest, si in ea nec recte factis praemia extent vlla, nec supplicia peccatis. In Verrem 5. est utilius unius improbi supplicio multorum improbitatem coercere, quàm propter multos improbos uni parcere. Offic. 1. Non satis est eum qui lacesserit, injuriae suae penitere; ut ipse nequid tale posthac committat, & caeteri sint ad injuriam tardiores. This is the common sense of all that know what it is to govern.

Obj. But God is so good, that all his Punishments tend at last to the sinners good, and are merely castigatory.

Obj. But God is so good, that all his Punishments tend at last to the sinners good, and are meerly castigatory.

Answ. God is so wise, that he knoweth better than we what is good and fittest to be done. And God is so good, that for the honour of his Government, and Holiness, and Goodness, he expresseth his hatred of sin, to the final ruin of the sinners. And he is so wise and good, that he will not spare the offender, when the penalty is necessary to the good of the innocent, to prevent their falls. The Objection is a surmise not only groundless, but notoriously false.

Answ. God is so wise, that he knoweth better than we what is good and fittest to be done. And God is so good, that for the honour of his Government, and Holiness, and Goodness, he expresseth his hatred of sin, to the final ruine of the sinners. And he is so wise and good, that he will not spare the offendor, when the penalty is necessary to the good of the innocent, to prevent their falls. The Objection is a surmise not only groundless, but notoriously false.

§. 10. He that would know how far punishment is necessary to the ends of Government, must first know how far the Penal Law it self is necessary; for the first and chiefest benefit to the Common-wealth is from the Law, and the next from the Execution.

¹The first benefit is to constrain men to duty, and to restrain them from doing ill. This is done immediately by the fear of punishment, (with the expectation of the benefit): This fear of punishment is to be caused by the rational expectation of it, if they do offend. This expectation is to be caused by the commination of the Law. When the Law saith, [He that sinneth shall suffer] the Subject avoideth sin for fear of suffering. Therefore the Subject must believe that the Law-giver meaneth as he speaketh, even to govern and judge in Justice according to that Law: and he that can but make the Subject believe, that the Governor doth but affright men with a lie, and meaneth not to execute his penalties, shall easily make his Laws of none effect, and turn loose offenders to presumptuous disobedience. Therefore the fore-belief of execution is necessary to the efficacy of the Law, which else is but as a Mawkin to affright away birds, and fit to work on none but fools. And if it be so necessary a duty to the Subject to believe that the Law shall be the Norma judicii, and shall be executed; then in our present case it is certainly true: For God cannot lie, nor make it the duty of the world to believe a lie, nor need so vile a means to keep the world in order. So that it is most evident, that if the Law be necessary, the execution of it is ordinarily necessary; and either the execution, or some means as effectual to the ends of Government, is ever necessary.

¹The first benefit is to constrain men to duty, and to restrain them from doing ill. This is done immediately by the fear of punishment, (with the expectation of the benefit): This fear of punishment is to be caused by the rational expectation of it, if they do offend. This expectation is to be caused by the commination of the Law. When the Law saith, [He that sinneth shall suffer] the Subject avoideth sin for fear of suffering. Therefore the Subject must believe that the Law-giver meaneth as he speaketh, even to govern and judge in Justice according to that Law: and he that can but make the Subject believe, that the Governour doth but affright men with a lie, and meaneth not to execute his penalties, shall easily make his Laws of none effect, and turn loose offendors to presumptuous disobedience. Therefore the fore-belief of execution is necessary to the efficacy of the Law, which else is but as a Mawkin to affright away birds, and fit to work on none but fools. And if it be so necessary a duty to the Subject to believe that the Law shall be the Norma judicii, and shall be executed; then in our present case it is certainly true: For God cannot lie, nor make it the duty of the world to believe a lie, nor need so vile a means to keep the world in order. So that it is most evident, that if the Law be necessary, the execution of it is ordinarily necessary; and either the execution, or some means as effectual to the ends of Government, is ever necessary.

1. 1All Laws were made for these two causes, Both that no man might be suffered to do that which is unjust; and that transgressors being punished, the rest might be made better. Demosth. Or. 2 cont. Aristog. It is your part who are Judges to preserve the Laws, and to make them strong and valid: for it is by the benefit of these that good men are better than the bad. Id. ib. Or. 1. The Government is useless which hath not nerves and force against the wicked and injurious, and in which pardon and the request of friends can do more than the Laws. Id. Or. de fals. leg. Let no man be thought of so great authority as to escape unpunished, if he breaks the Laws. Id 3. Olynth. Puniendis peccatis tres esse causas existimatum est 1. Cur adhibetur poena castigandi & emendandi gratia; ut is qui deliquit attentior fiat correctiorque 2. Quum dignitas ejus authoritasque in quem peccatur tucada est, ne praetermissa animadversione contemptum ei pariat 3. Propter exemplum ut caeteri metu poenae terreantur. Gel. l. 6.All Laws were made for these two causes, Both that no man might be suffered to do that which is unjust; and that transgressors being punished, the rest might be made better. Demosth. Or. 2 cont. Aristog. It is your part who are Judges to preserve the Laws, and to make them strong and valid: for it is by the benefit of these that good men are better than the bad. Id. ib. Or. 1. The Government is useless which hath not nerves and force against the wicked and injurious, and in which pardon and the request of friends can do more than the Laws. Id. Or. de fals. leg. Let no man be thought of so great authority as to escape unpunished, if he breaks the Laws. Id 3. Olynth. Puniendis peccatis tres esse causas existimatum est 1. Cur adhibetur poena castigandi & emendandi gratia; ut is qui deliquit attentior fiat correctiorque 2. Quum dignitas ejus authoritasque in quem peccatur tucada est, ne praetermissa animadversione contemptum ei pariat 3. Propter exemplum ut caeteri metu poenae terreantur. Gell. l. 6.

§. 11. Therefore he that would know what degree of punishment it is meet and just for God to execute, must first know what degree it is meet for him to threaten, or make Due by Law: or rather how much he hath made due: Because what God should do, is best known by what he actually doth.

If a temporal, short, or small measure of Penalty be sufficient to be threatened in the Law, for the present attaining of the ends of Government, then such a punishment is sufficient in the execution. But if the threatening of an endless punishment in another world be little enough; in suo genere, to prevail now with Subjects for order and obedience, then the execution will be therefore necessary by consequence.

If a temporal, short, or small measure of Penalty be sufficient to be threatned in the Law, for the present attaining of the ends of Government, then such a punishment is sufficient in the execution. But if the threatning of an endless punishment in another world be little enough; in suo genere, to prevail now with Subjects for order and obedience, then the execution will be therefore necessary by consequence.

§. 12. It followeth not therefore that Punishment or Rewards must cease, if the ends be past in natural existence; because Moral means may in time be after their end, to which they were ⟨p. 165⟩appointed to operate in esse cognito;¹ and that penalty which is perpetuated may be a means to the ends already attained: that is, the threatenings, and the expectation of them; and then the honour of the Ruler's veracity and justice bindeth him to the execution.

§. 12. It followeth not therefore that Punishment or Rewards must cease, if the ends be past in natural existence; because Moral means may in time be after their end, to which they were ⟨p. 165⟩appointed to operate in esse cognito;¹ and that penalty which is perpetuated may be a means to the ends already attained: that is, the threatnings, and the expectation of them; and then the honour of the Ruler's veracity and justice bindeth him to the execution.

1. 1In judicando vel corrigendo haec est lexut aut eum quempunit emendet, aut poena ejus caeteros meliores reddat; aut sublatis malis securiores caeteri vivant. Sen. de Clem.

§. 13. What ever reward or punishment is annexed to sin by the Law, is offered with the duty and sin to the subjects choosing or refusing; and no man is in danger of any punishment but he that chooseth it, in its self or in its annexed cause. And he that will have it, or will have that which he is told by God is annexed to it, (especially if it be deliberately and obstinately to the last) hath none to blame of cruelty towards him but himself, nor nothing to complain of but his wilful choice.