Reliquiæ Baxterianæ, or, Mr. Richard Baxters narrative of the most memorable passages of his…

Now the Scope of our Argument was to show, that if you speak of [a command upon the penalty of the question] your Distinction helps you not to shake our Argument, because as it is true that the Text speaketh not of things so commanded, so the thing that we are proving is, that it is the sense of the Text to forbid all such commands. If it be the sense of the Text to forbid such commands, then your Distinction is frivolous, and the use of it here prevented, and our Argument stands good: But it is the sense of the Text to forbid all such commands: Ergo—The Minor we are to prove hereafter, when we are further called to it by your Answers. But if by [command] you mean any other command without penalty, or without the penalty forbidden, we argue, If it be all one as to our Case, whether it be so commanded or not, then your Distinction is frivolous, and our Argument stands good: But it is all one to our Case, whether it be so commanded or not: Ergo—This was the Sum of our Rejection of your Answer, which we cannot prosecute till you will be persuaded, as we have required, to explain your Distinction; and then we shall know what to speak to. ⟨p. 351⟩But perhaps you take your very Refusal to explain it, to be an Explanation; and your words may seem to allow us to understand you of any command with this penalty or without, where you say [That Text which speaks of things under no command at all is brought nothing to the purpose, of the things which we debate of; being under some command of lawful Authority]. But still, that Text which forbiddeth any such command, and so taketh away the Authority of so commanding, is something to the purpose, as proving that no Humane Authority should so command: But this Text forbiddeth any such command, and so taketh away the Authority of so commanding—Ergo— And as it is a command consistent with [Receiving, Forbearing, &c.] that you may be understood to speak of, 1. If you speak de facto & de jure, and suppose that there be and ought to be no other command, then you grant us the Cause, that there should be no command, upon penalty of being [Not-received, Not-forborne, &c.] 2. If your Supposition be de facto only, then That commanding which consisteth with God's command [to Receive and forbear, &c.] altereth not the Case:

Now the Scope of our Argument was to shew, that if you speak of [a command upon the penalty of the question] your Distinction helps you not to shake our Argument, because as it is true that the Text speaketh not of things so commanded, so the thing that we are proving is, that it is the sence of the Text to forbid all such commands. If it be the sence of the Text to forbid such commands, then your Distinction is frivolous, and the use of it here prevented, and our Argument stands good: But it is the sence of the Text to forbid all such commands: Ergo—The Minor we are to prove hereafter, when we are further called to it by your Answers. But if by [command] you mean any other command without penalty, or without the penalty forbidden, we argue, If it be all one as to our Case, whether it be so commanded or not, then your Distinction is frivolous, and our Argument stands good: But it is all one to our Case, whether it be so commanded or not: Ergo—This was the Sum of our Rejection of your Answer, which we cannot prosecute till you will be perswaded, as we have required, to explain your Distinction; and then we shall know what to speak to.