If it be said, That it was also [the End of Mens taking it]. I answer, 1. He that saith it was the intended End of the Takers, must know all their hearts, and know that all their Ends were the same; which is impossible. 2. If it be only, [the commanded End] that is meant, I further answer, 1. It is visible in the Words of the Covenant, that there is no such End commanded: Reformation is the End expressed in the Covenant. 2. If it had been commanded, that was the sin of the Commanders, but proveth not that the Covenanters all took it to the commanded ends: And it bindeth according to the Takers sense. 3. If it had been certainly taken to a wrong end by every Man that took it (which is not provable), this would only prove the Actum Jurandi to be a sin, but not the Materiam Juratam to be evil; which is the heart of all the Controversy. There is great difference between the finis jurandi and the finis rei juratae; the end of swearing, and the end of the thing sworn. If the finis jurandi only be evil, it will only prove the actum jurandi to be a sin: but it will not prove the materia juramenti to be unlawful: and then the Oath may be obligatory (as shall be further showed). 4. Nay, go to the highest, and if it had been the end of the matter sworn, (viz. of the extirpation of Prelacy) that was evil, yet (as I have said) most Casuists, I think, will determine that the matter is separable in most Cases from the end, (unless it be a mere relative Act which the finis proximus is essential to). If a Man swear Allegiance to the King to a wrong end, is he not therefore obliged to Allegiance by his Oath? If a Man swear to do many things in themselves indifferent, upon a mistaken supposition that they are Duties, and so for the pleasing of God; when it is discovered to that Man, that they were media inepta, or no means at all to that end (of pleasing God) but things indifferent, I suppose he is not therefore disobliged, though he vowed them only sub ratione mediorum: because the keeping of a Vow about things lawful, is pleasing to God, though the matter vowed were indifferent. And if this hold not true, then wicked men can scarcely ever be obliged by any Oath or Vow to God or their Superiors, because they have wrong Ends in all, or most things which they do. But this last part of the Answer is needless, because the former are of undoubted certainty.
If it be said, That it was also [the End of Mens taking it]. I answer, 1. He that saith it was the intended End of the Takers, must know all their hearts, and know that all their Ends were the same; which is impossible. 2. If it be only, [the commanded End] that is meant, I further answer, 1. It is visible in the Words of the Covenant, that there is no such End commanded: Reformation is the End expressed in the Covenant. 2. If it had been commanded, that was the sin of the Commanders, but proveth not that the Covenanters all took it to the commanded ends: And it bindeth according to the Takers sence. 3. If it had been certainly taken to a wrong end by every Man that took it (which is not proveable), this would only prove the Actum Iurandi to be a sin, but not the Materiam Iuratam to be evil; which is the heart of all the Controversie. There is great difference between the finis jurandi and the finis rei juratae; the end of swearing, and the end of the thing sworn. If the finis jurandi only be evil, it will only prove the actum jurandi to be a sin: but it will not prove the materia juramenti to be unlawful: and then the Oath may be obligatory (as shall be further shewed). 4. Nay, go to the highest, and if it had been the end of the matter sworn, (viz. of the extirpation of Prelacy) that was evil, yet (as I have said) most Casuists, I think, will determine that the matter is separable in most Cases from the end, (unless it be a meer relative Act which the finis proximus is essential to). If a Man swear Allegiance to the King to a wrong end, is he not therefore obliged to Allegiance by his Oath? If a Man swear to do many things in themselves indifferent, upon a mistaken supposition that they are Duties, and so for the pleasing of God; when it is discovered to that Man, that they were media inepta, or no means at all to that end (of pleasing God) but things indifferent, I suppose he is not therefore disobliged, though he vowed them only sub ratione mediorum: because the keeping of a Vow about things lawful, is pleasing to God, though the matter vowed were indifferent. And if this hold not true, then wicked men can scarcely ever be obliged by any Oath or Vow to God or their Superiours, because they have wrong Ends in all, or most things which they do. But this last part of the Answer is needless, because the former are of undoubted certainty.