A27006:3695
Reliquiæ Baxterianæ, or, Mr. Richard Baxters narrative of the most memorable passages of his…
Reliquiæ Baxterianæ, or, Mr. Richard Baxters narrative of the most memorable passages of his life and times faithfully published from his own original manuscript by Matthew Sylvester.Reliquiæ Baxterianæ, or, Mr. Richard Baxters narrative of the most memorable passages of his life and times faithfully publish'd from his own original manuscript by Matthew Sylvester.
London: printed for T. Parkhurst, 1696
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
For when the Ignorance is culpable, it cannot be said that the guilty Will doth properly obedire, because it was a cause of its own mis-leading by the intellect: And in our Case, that Ignorance is always culpable. I do wonder, Ergo, that you should say, (and lay all on that Mistake) that [an erroneous Conscience binds as strongly as a found] for the Obligation of Conscience is subordinate to God's Preceptive Obligation. God makes Duty, and Conscience doth but apprehend Duty: So that an erring Conscience cannot make Duty entirely and materially: We must not make a God of an erring Conscience, much less can it make that no Sin, which God hath made Sin; yea, make that Duty, which God made Sin. God's Precepts lye thus: [1. Thou shalt not run before thou art sent] This is to the whole Man: and no Error of Mans can repeal it. Then [2. The Will must follow the right guiding Intellect.] This is natural, and excuseth not the following of an erring Judgment. Then [3. That the Will follow the practical Intellect whether right or wrong] that is no Precept, but the Nature of the Soul in its acting, because that Will is potententia ceca, non nata, ad intelligendum, sed ad volendum vel nolendum intellectum: So that it is a most intolerable thing to grant that Man's Error can make Duty no Duty, or Sin no Sin. If Man must will bonum apprehensum, he may necessitate himself to sin in his choice, by misapprehending; because then, though Bonum be still Bonum, yet it is apprehensum sub Ratione mali, & è contra, and so one of the two Necessaries to right Willing is wanting; but apprehending malum to be bonum doth not make it so; and Ergo, then the greater Necessary is wanting to the erring Conscience, viz. God's Constitution: So that whether you say as Durandus, that Conscientia errans Ligat at non obligat, or whether you say, as others, that ligare and obligare are all one; yet still the case is plain, that [an erring Conscience may entangle us in Sin, whether we obey or not obey it; but it cannot free us from Sin or from Duty, except where the case is such that God's Law hath made one and the same thing to be sin or no sin, according to Mens Knowledge or Ignorance; which never falls out but when the Ignorance is inculpable, which is never in our Case] Even while the Person erreth, he lieth under a double Obligation: 1. To do the Duty, or avoid the Sin. 2.
For when the Ignorance is culpable, it cannot be said that the guilty Will doth properly obedire, because it was a cause of its own mis-leading by the intellect: And in our Case, that Ignorance is always culpable. I do wonder, Ergo, that you should say, (and lay all on that Mistake) that [an erroneous Conscience binds as strongly as a found] for the Obligation of Conscience is subordinate to God's Preceptive Obligation. God makes Duty, and Conscience doth but apprehend Duty: So that an erring Conscience cannot make Duty entirely and materially: We must not make a God of an erring Conscience, much less can it make that no Sin, which God hath made Sin; yea, make that Duty, which God made Sin. God's Precepts lye thus: [1. Thou shalt not run before thou art sent] This is to the whole Man: and no Error of Mans can repeal it. Then [2. The Will must follow the right guiding Intellect.] This is natural, and excuseth not the following of an erring Judgment. Then [3. That the Will follow the practical Intellect whether right or wrong] that is no Precept, but the Nature of the Soul in its acting, because that Will is potententia ceca, non nata, ad intelligendum, sed ad volendum vel nolendum intellectum: So that it is a most intollerable thing to grant that Man's Error can make Duty no Duty, or Sin no Sin. If Man must will bonum apprehensum, he may necessitate himself to sin in his choice, by misapprehending; because then, though Bonum be still Bonum, yet it is apprehensum sub Ratione mali, & è contra, and so one of the two Necessaries to right Willing is wanting; but apprehending malum to be bonum doth not make it so; and Ergo, then the greater Necessary is wanting to the erring Conscience, viz. God's Constitution: So that whether you say as Durandus, that Conscientia errans Ligat at non obligat, or whether you say, as others, that ligare and obligare are all one; yet still the case is plain, that [an erring Conscience may entangle us in Sin, whether we obey or not obey it; but it cannot free us from Sin or from Duty, except where the case is such that God's Law hath made one and the same thing to be sin or no sin, according to Mens Knowledge or Ignorance; which never falls out but when the Ignorance is inculpable, which is never in our Case] Even while the Person erreth, he lyeth under a double Obligation: 1. To do the Duty, or avoid the Sin. 2.