Now these matters of God are primarily diversified to our consideration under the Distinction of True and Good, accordingly the primary *Distinction concerning the soul, is into the faculties of Understanding and Will; the former having Truth for its object, and the latter Goodness. This Truth is sometime known by evident Demonstration, and so it is the object of that we call knowledge (which also admits of divers distinctions according to several ways of demonstration, which I am loth here to puzzle you with) Sometime it is received from the Testimony of others, which receiving we call belief. When any thing else would obscure it, or stands up in competition with it; then we weigh their several evidences, and accordingly discover and vindicate the Truth, and this we call Judgment. Sometime by the strength, the clearness, or the frequency of the understandings apprehensions, this Truth doth make a deeper impression, & so is longer retained, which imp••ssion and retention we call memory. And as truth is thus variously presented to the understanding and received by it; so also is the goodness of the object variously represented to the will, which doth accordingly put forth its various acts. When it appeareth only as good in it self, and not good for us, or suitable▪ it is not the object of the will at all; but only this Enuntiation [It is good] is passed upon it by the Judgment, and withal it raiseth an admiration at its excellency. If it appear evil to us, then we Nill it. But if it appear both good in it self, and to us, or suitable, then it provoketh ⟨p. 726⟩the affection of Love: If the good thus loved do appear as absent from us, then it exciteth the passion of Desire: If the good so Loved and Desired do appear possible and feasible in the attaining, then it exciteth the passion of Hope, which is a compound of Desire and Expectation; when we look upon it as requiring our endeavour to attain it, and as it is to be had in a prescribed way, then it provokes the passion of courage or boldness, and concludes in resolution. Lastly, if this good be apprehended as present, then it provoketh to delight or Joy: If the thing it self be present, the Joy is greatest: If but the Idea of it (either through the remainder or memory of the good that is past, or through the fore-apprehension of that which we expect) yet even this also exciteth our Joy.
Now these matters of God are primarily diversifyed to our consideration under the Distinction of True and Good, accordingly the primary *Distinction concerning the soul, is into the faculties of Understanding and Will; the former having Truth for its object, and the latter Goodness. This Truth is sometime known by evident Demonstration, and so it is the object of that we call knowledg (which also admits of divers distinctions according to several ways of demonstration, which I am loth here to puzzle you with) Sometime it is received from the Testimony of others, which receiving we call belief. When any thing else would obscure it, or stands up in competition with it; then we weigh their several evidences, and accordingly discover and vindicate the Truth, and this we call Judgment. Sometime by the strength, the clearness, or the frequency of the understandings apprehensions, this Truth doth make a deeper impression, & so is longer retained, which imp••ssion and retention we call memory. And as truth is thus variously presented to the understanding and received by it; so also is the goodness of the object variously represented to the will, which doth accordingly put forth its various acts. When it appeareth only as good in it self, and not good for us, or suitable▪ it is not the object of the will at all; but only this Enuntiation [It is good] is passed upon it by the Judgment, and withal it raiseth an admiration at its excellency. If it appeare evil to us, then we Nill it. But if it appear both good in it self, and to us, or suitable, then it provoketh ⟨p. 726⟩the affection of Love: If the good thus loved do appear as absent from us, then it exciteth the passion of Desire: If the good so Loved and Desired do appear possible and feasible in the attaining, then it exciteth the passion of Hope, which is a compound of Desire and Expectation; when we look upon it as requiring our endeavor to attain it, and as it is to be had in a prescribed way, then it provokes the passion of courage or boldness, and concludes in resolution. Lastly, if this good be apprehended as present, then it provoketh to delight or Joy: If the thing it self be present, the Joy is greatest: If but the Idea of it (either through the remainder or memory of the good that is past, or through the fore-apprehension of that which we expect) yet even this also exciteth our Joy.
- *For I am […] I call them distinct faculties because it is the common Judgment and not my own.For I am 〈…〉 I call them di•stinct faculties because it is the common Judgment and not my own.
